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Abstract
Systems in which the success of an individual depends on the actions of others are described
by game theory. A dynamic learning mechanism has been introduced to this concept by
evolutionary game theory, which is based on Darwinian selection. This learning mechanism
increases the individual fitness and can be understood as an optimization procedure. As
the fitness depends on interactions between individuals, the object that is optimized changes
during the process in these systems. Darwinian selection is based on competition. How-
ever, cooperation between individuals is often observed in nature. A number of mechanisms
have been proposed to explain the evolution of cooperation. The determination of the rele-
vant mechanisms in biological and social systems is still subject of research. In this thesis,
cooperation based on similarity is discussed. A minimal model for such a mechanism is de-
rived. If agents only cooperate with others similar to themselves, segregation is observed in
spatially extended systems. In social systems this is usually not desired. We discuss mech-
anisms to avoid this segregation. If the tolerance towards others is systematically increased,
a cyclic dominance of the strategies emerges. This cyclic dominance leads to spiral waves
in spatially extended systems. In well mixed systems described by the replicator dynamics,
oscillations are observed. We derive a minimal model that allows analytical insight in the
dynamics of such systems. Previous models in this direction have mainly been based on
computer simulations.
The cyclic nature of the abundances of the different strategies is similar to the one observed
in cyclic games. In asymmetric games, these oscillations can be exploited by populations that
adapt their selection rates to the current state of the system. In this way, an increased payoff
is realized during the transient phase. This leads to a mechanism that increases the average
payoff of one population under the influence of external noise. The mechanism works in
cyclic games as well as in non-cyclic games. This is the first demonstration for an increased
payoff in a game that arises from stochastic fluctuations.
Kurzfassung
Systeme, in denen der Erfolg eines Individuums von den Handlungen anderer abha¨ngt,
werden durch die Spieltheorie beschrieben. Eine ¨Ubertragung dieses Konzeptes auf die Bio-
logie wurde mit der Evolutiona¨ren Spieltheorie eingefu¨hrt. Sie beschreibt einen dynami-
schen Lernprozess, der auf biologischer Selektion nach Darwin basiert. Dieser Lernmecha-
nismus, der auch als Optimierungsprozess verstanden werden kann, fu¨hrt zu einer Erho¨hung
der individuellen Fitness. Jeder Schritt in diesem Prozess kann zu einer Vera¨nderung des
Objektes fu¨hren, das optimiert werden soll, da die Fitness durch Interaktionen mit anderen
Individuen bestimmt wird. Da biologische Selektion auf Konkurrenz beruht, stellt sich die
Frage, wie Kooperation in solchen Systemen entstehen kann. Eine Reihe von Mechanismen
wurde vorgeschlagen, um die Entstehung von Kooperation zu erkla¨ren. Welche dieser Mecha-
nismen in biologischen und sozialen Systemen relevant sind, ist Gegenstand aktueller For-
schung. In dieser Arbeit wird Kooperation diskutiert, die auf ¨Ahnlichkeit basiert. Ein mini-
males Modell fu¨r einen solchen Mechanismus wird entwickelt. Wenn Individuen nur mit
anderen kooperieren, die ihnen a¨hnlich sind, beobachtet man in ra¨umlich ausgedehnten Syste-
men Segregation. In sozialen System ist dies im Normalfall nicht erwu¨nscht. Mechanismen,
die diese Segregation u¨berwinden, werden diskutiert. Wenn die Toleranz anderen gegenu¨ber
systematisch erho¨ht wird, entsteht eine zyklische Dominanz der Strategien. Die zyklische
Dominanz fu¨hrt zu Spiralwellen in ra¨umlich ausgedehnten Systemen. In gemischten Syste-
men mit zufa¨lligen Interaktionen, die durch die Replikator-Dynamik beschrieben werden,
ko¨nnen Oszillationen beobachtet werden. Das hier entwickelte Minimalmodell ermo¨glicht
ein analytisches Versta¨ndnis dieser Dynamik, die bisher vor allem mit Hilfe von Computer-
simulationen untersucht wurde.
Die zyklischen Schwankungen der verschiedenen Strategien werden in a¨hnlicher Weise
in zyklischen Spielen beobachtet. In asymmetrischen Spielen ko¨nnen diese Oszillationen
durch Populationen ausgenutzt werden, deren Selektionsraten sich adaptiv dem Zustand des
Systems anpassen. Auf diese Weise wird ein erho¨hter Gewinn auf Transienten erreicht. Dies
fu¨hrt zu einem Mechanismus, der den durchschnittlichen Gewinn einer Population unter
dem Einfluss von externem Rauschen erho¨ht. Dieses Pha¨nomen wird sowohl in zyklischen
als auch in nicht-zyklischen Spielen beobachtet. In dieser Arbeit wird damit zum ersten
Mal gezeigt, wie ein erho¨hter Gewinn in Spielen erzielt werden kann, wenn stochastische
Fluktuationen das System beeinflussen.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the past years, physicists have shown a growing interest in applying mathematical and
computational methods from physics in other fields, as biology, economics or social sci-
ences. These systems are far away from the extremes that are usually considered in physical
systems: Often, very small or very large structures are considered in physics, as elementary
particles or galaxies. Similarly, time scales are often extreme as femtoseconds in laser-pulses
or the age of the universe. Another scale is the order of the system: There are successful de-
scriptions of crystals which have a high degree of order and of gases which show no order.
The theoretical description for an intermediate degree of order is much more challenging:
Even glasses as partly ordered states or gases with interacting particles are tremendously
more difficult to describe than these ideal systems. However, most natural systems are de-
scribed by intermediate time scales and length scales. For example, ecological networks, in-
sect colonies, the immune system and human communication networks are highly complex
systems on human length and time scales. In many of these “complex systems”, physical
methods have proven to be very fruitful even in areas that are not traditionally connected to
physics (Schuster, 2002).
For example, the application of physical methods in economics lead to the new field of
“Econophysics”. A famous historic example for the relationship between Physics and eco-
nomics is the doctoral thesis of Louis Bachelier (1900), who described the market devel-
opment with methods very similar to Brownian motion - 5 years before Einstein’s famous
paper on this subject (Einstein, 1905). The parallels range from very heuristic examples that
compare statistical mechanics to microeconomics and thermodynamics to macroeconomics
(Saslow, 1999) to sophisticated mathematical tools, as the Black-Scholes equation for op-
tion pricing that is closely related to the diffusion equation (Deutsch, 2004). Another field
of research between physics and economics are minimal models for markets. The simplest
model for a market is the minority game (Challet and Zhang, 1997). The market is described
as a game in which individuals interact. In this game, players choose between “buying”and
“selling” in each time step. The group that is in the minority will be able to determine the
price and win in that time step. The application of methods from statistical physics in this
system has been very successful (Challet et al., 2000).
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Another example are artificial neural networks, which are well established in statistical
physics. These systems are inspired by the structure of the brain, which can be viewed as a
huge network neurons, which are comparable simple components. The human brain consists
of about 1011 such neurons, which are connected to ca. 104 other neurons. There are different
ways to characterize these neurons from a mathematical point of view. One possibility is to
take as many details into account as feasible for an analytical theory. This approach leads
to conductance based models as the Hodkin-Huxley model (Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952) and
similar formulations. Each neuron is described as a nonlinear dynamical system of several
variables. While this approach has been successful for describing a single neuron, it is not
longer feasible for the description of many neurons coupled in a network. However, it is
clear that the description of the brain is only meaningful on this higher level. For exam-
ple, computation is mainly parallel which prohibits a description on the single neuron level.
Hence, a more abstract model is needed. The simplest way to describe such a system is the
model of McCulloch and Pitts (1943). These neurons have only two states, either they fire
or they do not fire. The coupling of many of these two state systems leads to an Ising model,
where the complexity of the system is encoded in the couplings between spins. In biological
systems, the spins correspond to neurons and the couplings to synaptic strengths. (Hebb,
1949) made a hypothesis about the way in which the synaptic strengths can be changed in
order to describe a learning mechanism. The idea is that synaptic strengths between neurons
which fire at the same time are increased, i.e. the information stored in the synapses are cor-
relations in the input. This idea has been very successful in the training of artificial neural
networks. Learning in these systems is intimately connected to optimization. In most cases,
neural networks are trained in the same way in which an optimization procedure is carried
out. However, optimization usually implies that the environment of the system is fixed. The
system can adapt itself to a long-term change of the input structures, but it is not designed
to respond to a changing environment. The basic question that motivated this thesis can be
stated as “What happens, if a learning system learns from another learning system?” This
question has been addressed in simple systems of coupled neural networks consisting of a
“teacher” network and a “student” network (Metzler et al., 2000). However, the learning
mechanisms in neural networks remain complicated. A framework for systems in which
the success of an individual depends on the actions of others is given by game theory (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004).
1.1.1 Evolutionary Dynamics
Evolution through natural selection is often understood as a process that leads to an im-
provement of the population’s properties. Selection acts on a property called fitness, which
measures the adaptation of an individual to the environment and hence the ability to survive.
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For example, fitness can be measured by the number of offspring an individual produces. A
heritable trait that is connected with a higher fitness will spread within the population. An
increase of the average fitness of the population is therefore expected. This is often pictured
as a steady ascent on a so-called fitness landscape, which assigns a fitness value to the indi-
vidual’s properties. In general, these properties can discrete or continuous and constitute a
high dimensional space. For example, consider a genome of length Λ. Genomes are arranged
in a sequence space in such a way that nearest neighbors differ in one base only. As there are
four choices for each gene representing the four bases (adenine, guanine, cytosine, thymine),
this reasoning leads to a Λ-dimensional discrete lattice with four possible choices in each
dimension. The fitness landscape assigns a number to each of these 4Λ values and can be
viewed as a high-dimensional mountain range. The landscape metaphor suggests a move-
ment of the population over such a space to higher fitness values driven by natural selection,
see Fig. 1.1.
The proper technique for describing uphill motion on such a steady space is optimization
theory. Optimization usually tackles problems that have a solution that might not be accessi-
ble to analytical solutions due to their nonlinear character. A possible solution is chosen and
improved until a further optimization cannot longer improve the solution. Examples would
be the determination of a car body with minimal aerodynamic resistance or the wave function
of a Hamiltonian with minimal energy. Various computational methods to tackle these prob-
lems exist: Simple steepest descent (or ascent) methods start from an initial value and change
the parameters into the direction that yields the highest improvement until a local optimum is
reached. Simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983) allows to make steps into directions
that do not improve the solution with a probability decreasing over time (Schuster, 2002).
The goal of this procedure is to avoid local optima and to increase the probability to find
the best possible solution. Genetic algorithms consider an ensemble of solutions with very
different initial parameters. The best solutions are combined and modified in a random way
motivated by biological systems. Point mutations are considered as well as crossovers be-
tween two solutions. This improves the solutions in the ensemble until they are concentrated
around the optimal solution (Holland, 1975; Mitchell, 1996).
However, the idea of a fixed fitness landscape neglects the co-evolutionary character of
the evolutionary mechanism: Although the environment selects the adaptations, these adap-
tations can shape the environment again. By moving across a fitness landscape, populations
can change that landscape. This is particularly clear if several populations interact, because
each population is a part of the fitness landscape of the other: If a prey population evolves
such that it can escape from predators faster, this will increase the selection pressure on
predators. This leads to a different selection pressure for the prey population in the long
run. If the camouflage of a species improves by natural selection, predators will be selected
for abilities that can identify the species anyway. But even within a single population, the
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fitness
population density
Figure 1.1: Evolution with a fixed fitness landscape. The population distribution (red) moves
in the fitness landscape (blue) from lower to higher fitness values. In general, the
fitness landscape is defined in a high-dimensional discrete or continuous space.
fitness of a trait often depends on the prevalence of that trait: The selective advantage of a
given tree height, for example, depends on the heights of neighboring trees. Similarly, the
success of a given sex ratio depends on the overall sex ratio in the population. Therefore, the
fitness landscape is shaped by the phenotypic distributions of the involved populations. As
the population moves through the fitness landscape, new peaks and valleys form, channeling
its further motion, see Fig. 1.2. This viewpoint affects not only the intuition of evolution-
ary biologists but also their theoretical tools. For these problems, optimization theory is not
longer the appropriate tool as the fitness landscape is not longer fixed.
If the adaptive steps imply changes in the environment, eventually necessitating new adap-
tations, then game theory is the appropriate framework. This theory has first been developed
to reach a deeper understanding of simple two player zero-sum games, where one player
wins and the other one loses. However, game theory turned out to be much more general
in order to describe economic and social problems involving interdependencies among sev-
eral agents. Evolutionary biologists soon understood its potential and started applying it to
evolutionary problems, starting from the seminal paper of Maynard Smith and Price (1973).
The success of a strategy in a game depends on the co-player’s strategy, much as the fitness
of a phenotype depends on the composition of the population. Game theory is the math-
ematical toolbox for methodological individualism, the systematic attempt to found social
theory on the actions and needs of individual agents. For outcomes determined by selfish
genes (Dawkins, 1976) or by the selfish homo economicus Gintis (2000), this is the proper
instrument.
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Figure 1.2: Evolution with a changing fitness landscape. While the population distribution
(red) moves in the fitness landscape to the fitness maximum at the right (blue),
the height of this maximum is reduced and a new fitness maximum to the left
appears. In the next time step, the population distribution would evolve to the
left again.
1.1.2 Biological games
At first, the idea to apply game theoretic arguments to biology seems to be weird: Animals
do not play games. However, they do not choose between strategies, as humans usually do in
interactions. Instead, they are equipped with a strategy and their survival (or their potential to
produce offspring) depends on this strategy. Examples for such strategies are a tree’s height,
a parent’s sex ratio, a parasite’s virulence, a female’s choosiness, or a male’s ornament.
The applications of game theory in biology are as diverse as these examples for strategies
(Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). Evolutions of root structure or tree height are problems of
resource allocation. Conflicts concerning mate choice, sibling rivalry, and parent-offspring
antagonism provide motivation for game-theoretic models. The arms races between preda-
tors and prey, or between parasites and their hosts, offer many examples of games between
distinct populations. Communication in its widest sense, including alarm calls, threat dis-
plays, or sexual advertisement, lead to game-theoretic problems concerning false and honest
signaling. Acquisition and performance of human language in a heterogeneous population
can be studied as an evolutionary game. Increasingly, evolutionary game theory is used in
economic and social sciences and applied to experimental games with human subjects. Even
genes, bacteria, organelles, and viruses can be engaged in games of cooperation and con-
flict. The evolution of virulence of infectious agents is another vast field that makes use of
game-theoretic arguments. The classical understanding, based on constant selection, is that
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parasites evolve to maximize their basic reproductive ratio. Frequency-dependent selection
arises when several parasite strains superinfect the same host or when rapid evolution gen-
erates many different parasite mutants in any one infected individual. Lack of cooperation
among parasites can lead to shortsighted, maladapted levels of excessive virulence harming
both host and parasite.
The growth in the range of applications demanded an extension of classical game theory,
away from the static doctrine dominated by the equilibrium notion of John Nash. Evolution-
ary game theory introduced a learning mechanism to these systems (Maynard Smith, 1982),
leading to a dynamic theory.
The concepts of unbeatable strategy and evolutionary stability implicitly assume some un-
derlying population dynamics describing the potential success of invading mutants. An exact
formulation of these population dynamics depends on various details: First, the structure of
the population can have an important influence (Nowak and May, 1992). The dynamics can
be totally different if randomly chosen individuals or only nearest neighbor interactions in a
spatially extended system interact. In addition, the mechanisms for the transmission of the
relevant traits can be different, as evolutionary game theory can describe genetic inheritance
as well as cultural learning. For both scenarios, a wealth of different mechanisms is possi-
ble. Finally, the time scale underlying the evolutionary and ecological processes can be of
importance.
Of particular interest are cyclic games (variants of “rock-paper-scissors”) where the long-
term outcome is not a static Nash equilibrium but endless regular or irregular oscillations.
Even in very simple systems, Hamiltonian chaos has been found (Sato et al., 2002). Hence,
the static approach is in principle unable to provide a full analysis.
The most common approach for such a dynamic theory is to consider the deterministic
limit of infinite populations, which results in the replicator dynamics or related formula-
tions (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995). Within this framework, coevolutionary
dynamics can be analyzed directly.
In evolutionary game theory, usually a single population evolves under the influence of
interactions defined by a game. If groups of individuals interact, the first problem is the
definition of the own group. If a group aims to outwit others, it has to create some kind
of group identity. Such an identity is in the simplest case given by a common trait that is
directly visible. After a brief introduction to the field of evolutionary game theory, this thesis
analyzes such kind of models in spatially extended systems with local interactions as well
as in mixed populations. If the effect of neutral mutations is included by introducing a drift
term, cyclic dominance emerges.
In the next step, asymmetric conflicts are analyzed. In this setting, two (or more) pop-
ulations interact with different goals and ambitions. It is shown that a simple extension of
the usually applied coupled replicator dynamics with adaptive learning rates can lead to an
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increased payoff on average. In addition, we show that this learning mechanism can exploit
external fluctuations in a resonance like fashion. In the conclusions, we discuss the next
steps motivated by the questions that where raised in this thesis.
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1.2 Game Theory
1.2.1 Classical Game Theory
Classical Game theory is a branch of mathematics that studies interactions with formalized
incentive structures. The success of an individual in these interactions does not only depend
on the own action, but also on the actions of others. Starting as a branch of pure mathemat-
ics, game theory has become a more applied subject with a variety of applications, including
evolutionary biology, economics, and political science. John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern first formalized the subject in 1944 in their book “Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior” (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). This work included the method for find-
ing optimal solutions for two-person zero-sum games. John Nash (1950) generalized this
result to multi-player games. The equilibrium he defined is now well known as Nash equi-
librium (Holt and Roth, 2004). If every interaction partner uses the strategy of the Nash
equilibrium, no one will be better off switching his strategy.
This thesis focuses on the theory of non-cooperative games, where players optimize their
actions only according to their own interests. There are two nearly equivalent ways to formal-
ize non-cooperative games. An extensive form game (Gintis, 2000; Fudenberg and Tirole,
1998) consists of a number of players, a game tree, and a set of payoffs. Extensive form
games are very general, any finite number of players can interact in an arbitrary sequence.
This thesis, however, focuses on the theory of normal-form games (also called strategic form
games) with two players only.
A normal form game consists of a set of players, which we take to be the finite set
1, 2, . . . , I , the pure-strategy space Si for each player i, and the payoff function ui. The
pure strategy set consists of all possible actions of the corresponding player. A strategy pro-
file is given by s = (s1, s2, . . . , sI), where si is the strategy of player i. The payoff function
assigns a payoff ui to each player that depends on the strategy profile s. Normal forms for fi-
nite two-player games are usually depicted with the help of payoff matrices. As an example,
we consider the game
L M R
U (2, 1) (3, 2) (0, 1)
D (1, 2) (4, 5) (0, 2)
. (1.1)
The column and the row player have three and two strategies, respectively. The first entry is
the payoff of the row player for the corresponding strategy profile and the second entry is the
column player’s payoff. For example, if the row players chooses U and the column player
M we have s = (U,M) and the payoffs are u1 = 3 and u2 = 2. A mixed strategy of a player
i can be defined as a probability distribution xi over the pure strategies Si. In a two-player
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game, the payoff of the column player choosing strategy j can be computed from
uj =
∑
k
uk(sk)yk, (1.2)
where yk is the probability that the row player chooses the strategy k. A mixed strategy x
is a best reply to itself if no other strategy x′ leads to a higher payoff, i.e. ui(x) > ui(x′).
A Nash equilibrium is a point in which every player uses a strategy that is a best reply to
the strategies of the other players. If only pure strategies are involved in the equilibrium, it
is called pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, otherwise mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Nash
(1950) showed that every finite normal-form game has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Players are expected to play according to a Nash equilibrium if they have full information
on the payoff matrix and if they are hyperrational, i.e. if they include in their reasoning that
the the others will choose their strategy assuming that every player acts rationally. However,
this is not even the case in humans. Consider a game in which every player chooses an integer
number between 1 and 100. The player which is closest to half of the average wins. Although
it is obvious that the rational choice is 1, humans tend to choose significantly higher numbers
(Nagel, 1995).
Although the existence of the Nash equilibrium is proven in classical game theory, no
statement on the learning dynamics in games is given due to the static character of classical
game theory. Such a learning dynamics is given by evolutionary game theory.
1.2.2 From classical game theory to evolutionary game theory
The first approach to transfer game theoretical ideas explicitly to biology has been made
by Lewontin (Lewontin, 1961). His approach was to describe a species playing a game
against nature in order to minimize the probability of extinction. In 1973, Maynard Smith
and Price introduced an elegant way in which game theory can be applied to animal contests
(Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). The idea of applying game theory to animals seems to
be strange at first, as game theory was first developed with respect to hyperrational players,
as discussed above. This kind of rationality can hardly be expected from simple animals or
even bacteria. Three critical shifts have been made in order to transfer game theoretic ideas
to biology (Gintis, 2000).
Strategy
In classical game theory, players choose from a set of strategies. In biology, a species consists
of strategy sets (phenotypic variants). Each individual inherits a variant, which it uses in
its interactions. In this way, individuals do not choose their strategy, but the population
dynamics within the species eliminates less successful strategies. This allows to transfer
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game theoretic concepts even to simple bacteria. In biology, the payoff from classical game
theory is identified with the fitness of an individual1. The fitness is then identified with the
number of offsprings of an individual. In this way, the idea of hyperrationality is replaced
by Darwin’s “survival of the fittest”. Individuals that do not use the rational strategy simply
extinct.
Equilibrium
In Maynard Smith and Price (1973), the concept of “Evolutionary Stable Strategies” was
introduced, which is closely related to the Nash equilibrium of classical game theory. A
strategy is evolutionary stable if a population using that strategy cannot be invaded by a small
group of mutants using a different strategy. The original definition of evolutionary stability
is only valid for infinite populations. Recently, alternative definitions for finite populations
have been made (Schaffer, 1988; Gintis, 2000; Nowak et al., 2004). Every “Evolutionary
Stable Strategy” is a Nash equilibrium, but the reverse holds only for strict Nash equilibria.
Player interactions
In classical game theory players meet only once or they interact repeatedly with the same
opponent. In evolutionary game theory, individuals are randomly paired and use strategies
determined by their phenotype (Maynard Smith, 1982; Gintis, 2000). Although the game
is repeated, a basic assumption is that individuals do not meet the same opponent twice.
This avoids the concept of an individual memory. However, the species still has some kind
of abstract memory due to the distribution of phenotypes, which is determined by previous
interactions.
More recently, the requirement of random interactions has been relaxed. Evolutionary
games on lattices (Nowak and May, 1992; Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994) and on network
structures have been considered (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Ebel et al., 2002; Lieber-
man et al., 2005)
1.2.3 Social dilemmas
Probably the best known game-theoretic example is the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma (Trivers,
1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984), which belongs to the class of social
dilemma games. In these games, individual advantage and collective benefit contradict each
other. In physical terms, this can be compared to a frustrated interaction, since global and
local optimizations are not possible simultaneously.
1Usually, interactions have a relative influence on the fitness only. Other influences on the fitness of individ-
uals can often be described by a background fitness (Nowak et al., 2004).
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In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two players decide simultaneously whether they cooperate or
defect with the co-player. The payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is
P =
(
R S
T P
)
. (1.3)
If both players cooperate, they receive a reward R. However, if a player suspects that the
opponent will cooperate he is tempted to defect. This leads to an increased payoff T for
himself, while it decreases the payoff of his opponent to the sucker’s payoff S. If he suspects
his player to defect, he should also do the same, as the payoff for mutual defection P is
higher than the sucker’s payoff S. Hence, the best decision for every player is to defect,
no matter what the opponent will be doing. But in this case, both would be better off if
they found a way to agree on mutual cooperation. In general, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is
defined by two inequations. The first one is the ranking of the elements of the payoff matrix,
T > R > P > S, as described above. The second inequation is given by 2R > T + S,
which prevents that players are better off when they cooperate and defect alternately.
Mutual cooperation can be reached if players are equipped with a memory keeping track
of their interactions in repeated games. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) found that the “Tit for
Tat” strategy, which cooperates in the first round and then simply mimics the opponent’s last
move, is very successful compared to a wide range of different strategies. However, noise
can destroy the dominance of the “Tit for Tat” strategy. Lindgren (1991) introduced a model
with a basically unbounded strategy space wherein very complicated strategies can arise
which are capable of effectively correcting errors. Even for short memories, error correcting
strategies have been analyzed (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992, 1993a). It turned out that a very
successful strategy is “Pavlov”, which cooperates only if the player and its opponent have
chosen the same action in the previous round (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993b).
“Tit for Tat” is an example for direct reciprocity, as it cooperates with others that have also
cooperated before. If players can observe others in interactions they can assign reputations
to others. This kind of indirect reciprocity can also explain the emergence of cooperation
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b; Milinski et al., 2002). However, it is controversial what kind
of mechanism leads to cooperation in this case (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001). Recently,
it has been shown that a number of different mechanisms can effectively lead to cooperation
from indirect reciprocity (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004; Brandt and Sigmund, 2004). Ohtsuki
and Iwasa (2004) analyzed systematically all possible assignments of reputation from the
last interaction, providing a more general theory of indirect reciprocity.
Cooperation can also be found in models without reciprocity. Riolo et al. (2001) have
proposed a model in which agents cooperate based on their similarity. However, this model
assumes that individuals will always cooperate with others of their own kind. If this as-
sumption is relaxed, the game reduces to a Prisoner’s Dilemma again (Roberts and Sherratt,
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2002; Hauert, 2002b). Hence, the “Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity” cannot be
observed in this model. Nevertheless, models for similarity based cooperation are of general
interest. If interactions are not random, clusters of cooperating agents from a single group
can be found even in the presence of unconditional defectors not cooperating with their own
group. Hence, the similarity based mechanism can lead to higher levels of cooperation in
spatially extended systems (Axelrod et al., 2004). In mixed systems without spatial struc-
ture, the cooperation in the model of Riolo et al. occasionally breaks down. In Traulsen
and Schuster (2003) it has been shown that this arises from the destabilizing effect of neutral
mutations that lead to a drift towards more tolerant strategies.
A game very similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the snowdrift game2. Imagine two
drivers caught in a snowdrift. If one of them begins shoveling, the other one can stay in
his warm car, since he knows that he will get out. However, if the opponent stays in his
car one should begin shoveling to avoid spending the night in the car. The snowdrift game
is described by the inequation T > R > S > P . In other words, cooperation is the best
choice if the opponent defects, but if the opponent cooperates it is best to defect. Although
the snowdrift game is closely related to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there are some striking
differences. For example, spatial structure often leads to a lower degree of cooperation in
this game (Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Taylor and Day, 2004), while it increases cooperation
under many circumstances in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Nowak and May, 1992)
In order to reduce the number of free parameters in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, one can
introduce a cost c for cooperating with the opponent and a benefit b to quantify the help
received from the opponent. In this way, we find for the payoff matrix
P =
(
R S
T P
)
=
(
b− c −c
b 0
)
, (1.4)
which fulfills the requirements for a Prisoner’s Dilemma if b > c > 0. Without loss of
generality, we can set b = 1, leaving one normalized free parameter, 1 > c > 0. In this
thesis this notation for the Prisoner’s Dilemma and related games is applied. Several results
on the emergence of cooperation can be written in a very elegant way, in which the critical
parameter is b/c.
• Hamilton (1963) showed that kin selection, i.e. selection between relations, can only
work if
b
c
>
1
r
, (1.5)
2The snowdrift game is also known under a lot of different names, e.g. chicken game or hawk-dove game.
Common to these games is that the optimal pure strategy is to choose the opposite of what the opponent
does.
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where r is the relatedness between individuals. For fixed benefit to cost ratio, this lead
to a famous remark of the British biologist J. B. S. Haldane. He stated that he would
never give his life for a brother, but he would “jump into the river to save two brothers
or eight cousins”.
• Nowak and Sigmund (1998b) have analyzed a system of indirect reciprocity in which
agents have a state given by an image score. In this system, cooperation emerges if
b
c
>
1
q
, (1.6)
where q is the probability that an individual knows the status of others.
• For similarity based cooperation, we find a threshold that determines in which cases a
group can be invaded by a small fraction of others. A configuration is stable if
b
c
>
1
x
, (1.7)
where x is the fraction of agents that refuse to cooperate with other groups (Traulsen
and Schuster, 2003).
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is defined as a two player game. The equivalent for more players
are public goods games, introduced by Hardin (1968) as “Tragedy of the commons”. Every
player has the option to contribute to a common pool at some cost c. The common pool is
then increased by a factor of r > 1 and divided between all players - even those that did
not contribute to the pool. In a population of N players, the nc individuals contributing to
the pool receive a payoff pic = r c nc/N − c, while the remaining N − nc individuals re-
ceive pid = r c nc/N > pic. As in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rational strategy is not to
contribute, as a contribution to the pool is connected with a lower payoff. However, if every-
body contributed to the pool the whole population would be better off. Different strategies
have been proposed to solve this kind of social dilemma. An example is reward and punish-
ment (Sigmund et al., 2001; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002). If agents have the option to participate
voluntarily in the game, high degrees of cooperation can also be reached (Hauert et al., 2002;
Szabo´ and Hauert, 2002; Michor and Nowak, 2002). Hauert et al. (2002) introduced a third
strategy, the “loner” strategy. The idea is that players can decide whether they enter the pub-
lic goods game or if they rely on a small but safe payoff. Entering the public goods game, the
players still have the option to defect or to cooperate. The option to avoid the “Tragedy of the
commons” leads to a cyclic dominance of strategies: If mainly free-riders trying to exploit
others are participating in the game, it is best to become a loner. If the population consists of
loners only, it makes sense to start a public goods game and to increase the payoff. However,
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the public goods game attracts free-riders again that try to exploit the other players. At this
point, the cycle begins again. Cyclic games are discussed in detail in Section 1.2.4.
In the seminal paper of Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, altru-
istic behavior has been analyzed in artificial communities. However, cooperation is also
frequently observed in nature. For example, altruistic behavior has been reported in baboons
(Trivers, 1971; Packer, 1977), and vampire bats (Wilkinson, 1984). Milinski (1987) con-
ducted experiments with sticklebacks. When sticklebacks inspect predators the risk of being
recognized is much smaller when two sticklebacks inspect a predator simultaneously. How-
ever, in a pair of two sticklebacks the danger of being attacked is reduced if one moves a few
centimeters behind the second fish. Milinski experimented with a single fish only and used
a mirror to simulate a second stickleback. Different orientations of the mirror can be inter-
preted as a defecting or cooperating partner. These experiments showed that the sequence
of moves of the sticklebacks during their inspection of a predator can be described as a Tit
for Tat strategy. However, the fitness of individuals corresponding to the payoff is extremely
hard to measure (Nowak and Sigmund, 1999). Hence, it is not always possible to determine
the ranking of the elements in the payoff matrix (Milinski et al., 1997). Consequently, it is
not clear in which kind of interactions these individuals are involved.
Turner and Chao (1999) have shown experimentally that a certain kind of phages, i.e.
viruses that infect bacteria, are actually involved in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. In these exper-
iments, two types of bacteriophages are analyzed. In addition to the usual type of φ6 (the
cooperator), a mutant φH2 (the defector) is present which contributes fewer intracellular
products which are required for the replication of phages to the system. This leads to the
question why the cooperator is still present. Little is known about the underlying mecha-
nisms (Nowak and Sigmund, 1999), but it could be an example of group selection (May-
nard Smith, 1964, 1976; Wilson and Dugatkin, 1997): While host cells with a high fraction
of cooperator bacteriophages produce a high number of new phages, defector bacteriophages
cannot spread as they do not produce enough offspring.
1.2.4 Cyclic games
Another interesting class of games are cyclic games. The best known game of this type is the
two-person game “Rock-Paper-Scissors”. Each player chooses simultaneously rock (fist),
paper (flat hand) or scissors (two fingers). Scissors is beaten by rock, rock is beaten by paper
and paper is beaten by scissors again. In this game each strategy is cyclically dominated by
another strategy.
While most social dilemmas are defined in a symmetric setting in which every individual
has the same goals described by a single payoff matrix, the simplest cyclic game “Match-
ing Pennies” is an asymmetric conflict (Maynard Smith, 1982) in which both players have
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different ambitions. Both players choose an action, “heads” or “tails”, simultaneously. The
first player wins if both actions are the same, while the second player wins if different ac-
tions have been chosen. If both players choose the strategy “win stay-lose shift”, they will
win alternately, as the strategies dominate each other cyclically3. An internal model of the
opponent’s learning rule can help to outwit the opponent (Schuster, 2003).
The cyclic dominance does not have to arise directly from the payoff matrix. In (Traulsen
and Schuster, 2003) an example is given in which the cyclic dominance is driven by neutral
mutations destabilizing a Nash equilibrium that is not an Evolutionary Stable Strategy.
In 1996, a first example for cyclic games in nature has been reported (Sinervo and Lively,
1996; Maynard Smith, 1996). In the side-blotched lizard males have one of three possible
throat colors, each associated with a different behavior. Orange-throated males establish
large territories holding several females. These populations can be invaded by males with
yellow-striped throats, which do not contribute to the defense of the territory. However, a
population of yellow-striped males can be invaded by blue-throated males, which defend ter-
ritories large enough to hold one female which they defend against sneakers. Once sneakers
are rare, it is advantageous to defend a large territory with several females and the cycle starts
with orange-throated males again. The cycle with three different strategies corresponds to the
rock-paper-scissors game, where each strategy is cyclically dominated by another strategy.
Another example for a cyclic game in nature has been given in (Kerr et al., 2002), where
dynamics in colicinogenic bacteria populations are analyzed. Colicinogenic bacteria possess
a plasmid containing genes that encode the toxic colicin, a colicin-specific immunity protein
making the cell immune to the colicin and a lysis protein causing the release of the colicin.
In the experiments of Kerr et al., the growth rate of resistant cells (R) was higher than the
growth rate of colicinogenic cells (C), but less than the growth rate of sensitive cells (S). In
this case, S can displace R (due to S’s growth-rate advantage), R can displace C (due to R’s
growth-rate advantage), and C can displace S (as C kills S). Hence, we recover a rock-paper-
scissors cycle again. In a mixed system, the resistant strain dominated the population. In
spatially extended systems, however, the coexistence of the strains arising from the cyclic
dominance was observed. The experiments have shown that local interactions can lead to
biodiversity.
3There are several other names for cyclic asymmetric conflicts, in biology a reasoning about parental care
leads to a cyclic game and to the name “Battle of the sexes”. In economics, however, the “Battle of the
sexes” is a 2× 2 game with two pure strategy Nash equilibria.
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1.3 Game Theory in spatially extended systems
1.3.1 Motivation
A central assumption of evolutionary game theory is that agents are paired randomly. In
reality, interactions are often restricted to small local groups. Although Axelrod and Hamil-
ton (1981) realized that territoriality will have large impact on game theoretic interactions,
extensive work on spatial games has started more than a decade later, when Nowak and May
(1992) introduced a cellular automaton based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Spatial game theory suffers from a wealth of possible algorithms which makes it difficult to
derive general conclusions. Possible parameters include the definition of the neighborhood,
the rule how new strategies are chosen and the synchronous or asynchronous nature of the
update rule (Hauert, 2002a). If memory is included, the number of possible parameters is
further increased. The complex spatial evolution of these systems can often only be studied
by means of computer simulations (Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994).
Recently, also more complicated spatial structures have been analyzed. The most promi-
nent example are games on networks (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Holme et al., 2003;
Ebel and Bornholdt, 2002a; Lieberman et al., 2005). As a new degree of freedom is intro-
duced in the topology here, the analysis of spatially extended games on network structures is
more challenging than on regular lattices. Another approach is to introduce agents that move
in a spatial environment and choose their interaction partner (Aktipis, 2004). These systems
can be viewed as a special case of game theoretic interactions on an evolving network struc-
ture. If even the network structure is subject to evolution, the system becomes even more
complex (Ebel and Bornholdt, 2002b).
1.3.2 Comparison with cellular automata
Spatially extended games with synchronous update are closely related to cellular automata.
The introduction of spatially extended games by Nowak and May (1992) is in principle a
cellular automaton with an update rule defined by the underlying game. In both cases, a
discrete state is assigned to each lattice site in discrete time steps. The new state depends on
the state of neighboring sites. However, only a small fraction of possible cellular automata
is realized by spatially extended games:
• In spatially extended games, a player usually compares its payoff with all the neigh-
boring players regardless of their spatial relationship. Hence, the standard setup of
spatial games describes only isotropic cellular automata.
• Usually, players update according to the payoff of their neighbors, which in turn de-
pends on the strategies of their neighbors. Hence, the update rule has to take into
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account the neighbors of the neighbors as well. This is in contrast to a lot cellular au-
tomata, as Conway’s famous game of life (Gardner, 1970) or the Sierpinski automaton
(Wolfram, 1984; Claussen et al., 2004).
Although cellular automata are usually analyzed with two possible states only, more gen-
eral automata are possible. The same holds for game theory: Although in general s×s games
require s different states, the majority of spatial games only analyzes 2 × 2 games (Hauert
and Doebeli, 2004; Nowak and May, 1992). For s×s games, the number of necessary update
rules is given by sn, where s is the number of strategies and n is the number of sites involved
in the update procedure. Therefore, the complexity of the automata increases rapidly with s.
For example, in the simplest spatial automata introduced in (Traulsen and Claussen, 2004),
the number of necessary update rules is 45×5 ≈ 1015. For the usual prisoners dilemma in the
same setting, “only” 25×5 ≈ 3 × 107 rules are necessary. The complexity increases further,
if memory is included (Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994).
1.3.3 Mathematical tools
Due to the wealth of possible algorithms for game theory in spatially extended systems, few
general analytical methods exist. Often, these methods are only applicable in very simple
systems with various restrictions.
Mean field theories
A first approximation to analyze a spatially extended game theoretic system is given by a
mean field theory. For this purpose, the spatial character of the system is neglected and
interactions between randomly chosen individuals from a large population are considered.
Often, this is termed as a “well-mixed system”. Usually, the replicator dynamics is applied
for this purpose. In section 1.4.2 this method is discussed in detail.
Pair approximation
An more sophisticated analytical approximation of the spatial dynamics can be obtained
through pair approximation, which explicitly takes spatial effects into account (Iwasa, 2000;
Sato and Iwasa, 2000; Hauert and Szabo´, 2005). Instead of considering the frequency of
strategies as in well-mixed populations, i.e. in mean-field theory, pair approximation tracks
the frequencies of strategy pairs. Such pair configurations indicate the probability of finding
an individual playing strategy j accompanied by a neighbor playing i. In principle, an arbi-
trary finite set of strategies can be considered. However, even for three strategies, the algebra
becomes rather tedious and does often not offer new insight into the character of the sys-
tem. Pair approximation is based on three conditions: compatibility, symmetry and closure.
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Consistency and compatibility with mean-field theory requires that the global fraction of a
certain strategy i can be recovered from the frequencies of strategy pairs. Symmetry requires
that the probability to find a strategy j in the neighborhood of i is the same as the probability
to find a strategy i in the neighborhood of j. Finally, configuration probabilities of larger
clusters are approximated by pair configuration probabilities - this is known as closure.
Generally, predictions by pair approximation are less reliable near extinction thresholds
because this approach does neither account for corrections arising from loops nor the long
range correlations occurring in vicinity of critical transitions. The accuracy of this technique,
however, can be improved by considering configuration probabilities of larger clusters.
Although the method is in principle not reduced to two strategies, the analysis of three or
more strategies becomes very lengthy.
Mapping to physical systems
Some simple game theoretic systems on two-dimensional lattices can be mapped to spin
models (Herz, 1994). However, while the relationship between models from game theory and
solid state physics is often interesting from a conceptual point of view (Hauert and Szabo´,
2005), few analytical insights can be gained from such a mapping. So far, this mapping
has mainly been considered for two strategy systems, which are mapped to two state Ising
models. In general, a local external magnetic field has to be assumed for this mapping. In
addition, local interactions cannot always be described by a single coupling parameter Jij .
For these more general Ising models, a closed analytical solution has not been found so far,
limiting the predictive potential of such mappings.
Fundamental clusters
The analysis of fundamental clusters is a straightforward method for spatial game theoretic
systems and more general for cellular automata (Hauert, 2001). Configurations of a cluster of
individuals with the same strategy in an environment of another strategy are considered. The
conditions are derived under which such a cluster grows or shrinks. This analysis is made for
a 1×1 cluster, a 2×1 cluster, a 2×2 cluster, ... For larger clusters, this analysis can be made
for corners, edges, and other sites independently. This concept shows a strong dependency on
the underlying lattice geometry and the neighborhood. Only local development is discussed.
This method allows to analyze some general features of the spatiotemporal dynamics, but
does not always allow insights on the global dynamics. Although the method is not in general
restricted to two strategies only, the analysis of more complicated systems is usually not
feasible.
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Partial differential equations
Many spatially extended physical systems can be described by partial differential equations,
as fluid dynamics by the Navier Stokes equation. A simpler example is the diffusion equa-
tion. Many pattern formation phenomena observed in game theoretic systems can also be
found in these reaction diffusion systems. For example, spiral waves can be found in a
simple reaction-diffusion system with two ingredients only, an activator with concentration
a(r, t) and a controller with concentration c(r, t). Consider the reaction-diffusion system
a˙ = Da∆a +
3a− a3 − c
τa
(1.8)
c˙ = Dc∆c+
a− δ
τc
, (1.9)
where Da and Dc are diffusion constants, τa and τc are time constants describing the reac-
tions and δ is a free parameter. In this system spiral waves can be found, as in the system
analyzed in (Traulsen and Claussen, 2004). However, there are several restrictions to this
approach in game theory: First, game theoretic systems usually consider a finite strategy set
only, whereas the concentrations in a reaction diffusion system change continuously. Hence,
the relevant scales of the system have to be large enough to allow a description of concen-
trations. Second, game theoretic systems often explicitly rely on small local structures and
next neighbor interactions. The interaction with a “concentration” of other strategies might
change the qualitative dynamics of the system. For example, the notion of a concentration
could lead to the system in which selection is not longer restricted to the individual, but to
local groups. Such a kind of group selection is usually not desired in spatially extended game
theoretic systems. Further, this reasoning becomes very complicated if more than two strate-
gies are involved. These systems are equivalent to reaction-diffusion systems with more than
two reacting substances. As these reaction diffusion systems are usually not accessible for
analytical solutions, this approach is of limited interest in game theoretic contexts.
Systems with more than two strategies
All the methods introduced in this section are primarily designed for systems with two strate-
gies only. Some of them can be generalized to more complicated systems, but dealing with
three or more strategies is challenging and many analytical tools fail in these systems. Usu-
ally, only computer simulations are feasible. However, insight can sometimes be gained by
introducing new parameters to classify and compare different spatial structures. In (Traulsen
and Claussen, 2004) topological charges have been introduced for this purpose in order to
locate the tips of spiral waves in the system. Such new parameters have to be defined for
each system independently and are usually not applicable in general.
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1.4 Mean field theories
1.4.1 Definition of mean field theories
In physical terms, a mean field theory is defined by restricting individual interactions to
interactions with an averaged model system. The simplest example is the mean-field theory
for the two-dimensional Ising model, where the energy of a spin is computed by assuming
that neighboring spins have an averaged orientation. The starting point is to compute the
average orientation of a spin in a magnetic field given by the (unknown) average orientation
of the remaining spins. The assumption that the considered spin has the same orientation
as the average spin leads to a self consistency equation for the spin orientation that can be
solved directly. Starting from a regular lattice, the mean field theory becomes exact for high
dimensions (usually, the critical dimension for which the mean field theory first becomes
exact is d = 4). It is also exact if the lattice is either fully connected (i.e. every spin interacts
with every other spin) or if random interactions are considered (Hauert and Szabo´, 2005).
The introduction of a mean field theory often assumes implicitly an infinite system, but in
general it can be defined for arbitrary system size. Hence, in game theoretic interactions a
mean field theory should be possible without the regular assumption of infinite populations.
Nowak et al. (2004) have introduced a model which can be considered as such a mean field
theory in finite populations. In this model, individuals interact with an averaged opponent.
The evolutionary dynamics is given by the classical Moran process (Moran, 1962). However,
there are many possibilities to define such theories in finite populations. The connection to
the usual concepts considering infinite populations is discussed in (Traulsen et al., 2005a).
1.4.2 Replicator dynamics
Often, the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Schuster and Sigmund, 1983; Hof-
bauer et al., 1979; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995) is applied as a mean field
theory for the evolutionary dynamics of game-theoretic systems. It describes the evolution-
ary dynamics in the limit of large populations.
As a simple example, we consider the replicator dynamics for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
with the payoff matrix equation 1.4. We have only two strategies, cooperators and defectors.
Randomly chosen individuals interact. Hence, one variable is sufficient to determine the state
of a large population: The fraction of defectors x determines also the fraction of cooperators,
1− x. How does x change in time? The basic assumption of the replicator dynamics is that
the growth rate of the fraction of a strategy x is proportional to the relative success of the
corresponding strategy. A defector expects to meet another defector with probability x. With
probability 1− x, he will be able to exploit a cooperative individual. In this case, his payoff
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will be b. Hence, the defector expects the payoff
piD = 0× x+ b× (1− x) = b(1− x). (1.10)
On the other hand, a cooperator will meet a defector with probability x and obtain the payoff
−c. His partner will be cooperative with probability 1− x, leading to the payoff b− c . His
expected payoff is
piC = −c× x+ (b− c)× (1− x) = b(1− x)− c = piD − c. (1.11)
Since piC < piD, the defectors are always more successful than cooperators. As there are x
defectors and 1− x cooperators in the population, the average payoff is
〈pi〉 = xpiD + (1− x)piC = (b− c)(1− x) (1.12)
With these payoffs, the replicator dynamics is given by
x˙ = x (piD − 〈pi〉) = cx (1− x) (1.13)
Equation 1.13 can be viewed as a dynamical system. The system has two fixed points.
The fixed point at x = 0 is unstable: A small derivation from this fixed point to positive x is
amplified and the system leaves the fixed point. This is the situation in which a small fraction
of defectors destroys a cooperative population. The second fixed point at x = 1 is stable, as
a small deviation from this point is dampened again. A small fraction of cooperators cannot
invade a population of defectors. However, the average payoff at the unstable fixed point
x = 0 is higher than the average payoff at the stable fixed point x = 0. This recovers the
dilemma situation again: In a cooperative population, every individual is tempted to increase
its own payoff and to defect. However, if everybody switches to defection this advantage is
reversed: Each individual decreased his payoff from b− c to 0 when it tried to increase it to
b. Equation 1.13 can even be solved directly. The solution of this differential equation is
x(t) =
1
1− x(t0)−1
x(t0)
e−c(t−t0)
(1.14)
This solution describes the approach from an initial point x(t0) > 0 to the stable fixed point
at x = 1, i.e. the state with defectors only. For x(t0) = 0 we have x(t) = 0, since x = 0 is a
fixed point. In all other cases, the stable fixed point is approached asymptotically in the limit
t→∞.
Many evolutionary game theoretic models are based upon the replicator dynamics. Al-
though a fruitful place to start, the replicator dynamics make a number of assumptions which
can reasonably be questioned for real populations. Essentially, an infinite population is as-
sumed. Although a valid approximation for large population, crucial differences to finite
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populations are possible (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004). In addition, two play-
ers are always equally likely to meet and interact. In a spatially extended system this is an
unrealistic assumption. Further, mutations are neglected in the replicator dynamics, which
often have a crucial influence (Traulsen and Schuster, 2003). Hence, an extincted strategy
will never be present in the system.
Nonetheless, the replicator dynamics can serve as a first approximation. As it has been
analyzed in great mathematical detail (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995), it pro-
vides a steady foundation for further analysis.
The general form of the replicator dynamics is the following: Consider a normal-form
game within a single population with N different types of individuals. The payoff of each
individual depends on the current state of the population. An individual of type i receives
the average payoff pii =
∑N
i=1 Pijxj , where xj is the fraction of individuals of type j and Pij
is the payoff matrix. The replicator dynamics is given by
x˙i = ηxi (pii − 〈pi〉) , (1.15)
where 〈pi〉 = ∑Ni,j=1 xiPijxj is the average payoff in the whole population and η is a se-
lection rate. Obviously, we have
∑N
i=1 x˙i = 0, i.e. the total population size is conserved.
The fraction of individuals that have a fitness above the average fitness increases, while the
fraction of individuals with lower than average fitness decreases. A strategy i that is not
present at time t0 will never appear in this dynamics for any t > t0. However, extensions of
the replicator dynamics in order to include mutations have been proposed (Page and Nowak,
2002; Stadler and Schuster, 1992).
Often, temporal discretizations of the replicator dynamics are considered. Such a dis-
cretization can be intricated, as Eq. (1.19) can have constants of motion which are often
not conserved in a time discrete version that results from an Euler discretization (Hofbauer,
1996). These constants of motion arise from a cyclic dominance of strategies, as in the game
of rock-paper-scissors. It can be defined by the payoff matrix
P =

 0 +1 −1−1 0 +1
+1 −1 0

 . (1.16)
We identify the fraction of the strategies rock, paper, and scissors with x1, x2, and x3, re-
spectively. x3 can be computed as 1 − x1 − x2, since
∑3
i=1 xi = 1. For this payoff matrix,
equation (1.19) has the constant of motion H = ln x1 + ln x2 + ln x3. The invariance of H
can be shown in a straightforward way: The time derivative of H reduces to
H˙ =
x˙1
x1
+
x˙2
x2
+
x˙3
x3
= pi1 + pi2 + pi3 − 3〈pi〉. (1.17)
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For the payoff of the strategy “rock” we find pi1 = x2 − x3. The remaining payoffs follow
from a cyclic change of the indices: pi2 = x3 − x1 and pi3 = x1 − x2. Obviously, we
have
∑3
i=1 pii = 0. These symmetry properties lead also to
∑3
i=1 piixi = 〈pi〉 = 0 and
hence to the conservation of H , H˙ = 0. The usual numerical solvers for such differential
equations, as Euler or Runge-Kutta discretization, are not recommended for the study of
replicator equations with such constants of motion, as they do not take care of the peculiar
conservation properties (Hofbauer, 1996).
In general, equation (1.19) can show various different dynamics: In the simplest case,
an approach to fixed points is described, as in the prisoner’s dilemma. For more than two
strategies, oscillations can appear in cyclic games, as discussed above. Even irregular and
chaotic dynamics are possible.
If interactions between two populations are considered, a straightforward generalization of
the replicator dynamics is given by the coupled replicator dynamics (Schuster and Sigmund,
1981; Hofbauer, 1996). In this case, the expected payoff of a a certain action depends on the
strategy distribution of the other population. Hence, the mutual dependence on the payoffs
leads to a coupling of the replicator equations for both populations. Consider a game between
two populations, X and Y , with the payoff matrices P xij and P
y
ij , respectively. In general, the
number of strategies can be different. Here we restrict ourselves to the case where both
populations have the same number of strategies. Every individual is only interacting with
the other population. The coupled replicator equations take the form
x˙i = ηxxi
(
N∑
j=1
P xijyj −
N∑
i,j=1
xiP
x
ijyj
)
(1.18)
y˙i = ηyyi
(
N∑
j=1
P yijxj −
N∑
i,j=1
yiP
y
ijxj
)
Although these equations are very simple, they can show a wealth of dynamical phenom-
ena, including chaos (Sato et al., 2002; Sato and Crutchfield, 2003). However, it is unclear
whether the coupled replicator dynamics is the appropriate description for learning in asym-
metric conflicts (Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer, 1996). In games with overlapping gen-
erations, the adjusted replicator dynamics (Maynard Smith, 1982; Weibull, 1995) can be a
more valid description. In the adjusted replicator dynamics, the evolution equations (1.19)
and (1.18) are divided by the average fitness of the corresponding population. For example,
equation (1.19) is changed to
x˙i = ηxi
pii − 〈pi〉
〈pi〉 , (1.19)
For the usual replicator dynamics, the effect of this operation corresponds to a re-scaling
of time and can usually be neglected. For the coupled replicator dynamics, however, the
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stability of fixed points can be altered (Maynard Smith, 1982). The adaptive learning rates
discussed in (Traulsen and Schuster, 2003) can be viewed as an interpolation between these
two types of dynamics.
It should be noted that other game dynamics have also been discussed, as imitation dy-
namics, best-response dynamics, and many more (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). However,
the standard approach in evolutionary game theory remains the replicator dynamics.
1.4.3 Mathematical tools
From a conceptual point of view, the replicator equations (1.18) and (1.19) are nonlinear
first order differential equations. In general, an analytical solution of these systems is not
possible. Hence, the analysis is restricted to the qualitative theory of differential equations,
i.e. they have to be viewed as nonlinear dynamical systems.
Dynamical systems
A dynamical system in continuous time is defined as
x˙ = f(x), (1.20)
where f(x) is a nonlinear or linear function of the vector x. Even if a closed solution of (1.20)
is not possible, some general properties can be discussed. Of particular interest are the fixed
points of the system: If f(x0) = 0 the system will remain at x0 forever. The nature of the
fixed point can be assessed discussing the dynamics near the fixed point. If the fixed point is
stable, a small perturbation will lead back to the fixed point. Perturbations of unstable fixed
points lead away from these points.
Most of the properties of the systems discussed here can be transfered to discrete time.
However, sometimes qualitative differences in the dynamics can appear. A simple example
is the logistic growth equation
x˙ = cx(1− x), (1.21)
which describes the population growth of a population with a maximum size normalized to
1. An analytical solution is possible, see Equation (1.14), and describes the approach to
the maximum size. However, the discrete version of the differential equation, known as the
logistic map, shows chaotic behavior. Hence, the relationship between time discrete and time
continuous systems is not always trivial.
Stability of fixed points
In (Traulsen and Schuster, 2003), a dynamical system is analyzed by discussing the stability
of fixed points only. The stability of fixed points can be determined from a linearization
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around the fixed point. The linearization of (1.20) at x0 + h with fixed x0 and h≪ 1 reads
h˙j = fj(x0) +
∑
i
hi
∂fj
xi
. (1.22)
Since fj(x0) = 0 this can be written as
h˙ = J · h, (1.23)
where J is the Jacobian at x0. The effect of a small perturbation at the fixed point is now
determined by the Jacobian. If all eigenvalues of J have a negative real part, the perturbation
will be dampened and the system will move back to the fixed point. If all these eigenvalues
have a positive real part, the perturbation will be amplified and the system will leave the fixed
point. However, these cases are very special and in general, there will be some eigenvalues
with positive real part and some with negative real part. In these cases, the stability is dif-
ferent in different directions. Eigenvalues with positive real part correspond to an unstable
situation in the direction of the corresponding eigenvector. Eigenvalues with negative real
part correspond to an stable situation in the corresponding direction. For example, one eigen-
values with negative real part and one eigenvalue with positive real part in d = 2 correspond
to a saddle. The corresponding fixed point is attractive when movement in one direction is
considered. In a second direction, the fixed point is unstable.
For completeness, we note that a non-vanishing imaginary part of an eigenvalues leads to
a cycling around the fixed point. The real part determines whether the distance to the fixed
point increases or decreases in time.
Bifurcations
When the stability of a fixed point is modified due to a change of external parameters, several
scenarios are possible: For example, a fixed point can simply vanish or switch stability with
another fixed point. Several of these bifurcations are possible, three of them appear in this
thesis when the stability of fixed points of replicator equations is discussed. Here, a short
sketch of these bifurcations is given. For each bifurcation, a normal form can be defined
that describes the simplest possible system with such a bifurcation (Schuster, 1995; Argyris
et al., 1995).
• Pitchfork bifurcation
In a pitchfork bifurcation, one stable fixed point becomes unstable. At the same point,
two new stable fixed points appear. The normal form of a pitchfork bifurcation is given
by
x˙ = µx− x3. (1.24)
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This dynamical system has only one fixed point at x = 0 for µ < 0. Near this fixed
point, the third order term in x can be neglected. This shows immediately that this fixed
point is stable. For µ > 0 there are three fixed point. A linear stability analysis shows
that x = 0 is unstable for µ > 0, whereas the other two fixed points at x = ±√µ are
stable. The situation that a single stable fixed point becomes unstable and is replaced
by two symmetric stable fixed points is found in a variety of physical systems. For
example, the simplest mean field theory for the Ising model shows such a transition
for a critical temperature Tc. Above Tc, the system has only one fixed point describing
non-magnetized states. Below Tc, two magnetized states with different magnetic field
are possible.
• Saddle node bifurcation
In a saddle node bifurcation, a fixed point vanishes at a critical parameter value. The
normal form of the saddle node bifurcation reads
x˙ = µ− x2. (1.25)
For µ < 0, the system has no real fixed points. For µ > 0, two fixed points appear
at x = ±√µ. A linear stability analysis reveals that the fixed point at x = −√µ is
unstable and the fixed point at x = +√µ is stable. At the unstable position of an
ideal pendulum such a saddle node bifurcation occurs. An ideal pendulum pointing
upwards will stay in this position until a small disturbance moves it away from this
unstable fixed point. However, if the energy of the pendulum is high enough such that
the pendulum rotates, this is not longer a fixed point.
• Hopf bifurcation
A Hopf bifurcation describes a situation in which a stable fixed point is replaced by a
stable oscillating solution. The normal form of such a system in polar coordinates is
given by
r˙ = µr − r3 (1.26)
θ˙ = ω. (1.27)
For µ < 0 there is a stable focus at r = 0. For µ > 0 this focus becomes unstable.
Instead, an cyclic attractor at r = √µ appears. Hopf bifurcations are typically found
when the inset of turbulence is considered.
Stochastic differential equations
In (Traulsen et al., 2004b), an extension of the replicator to a stochastic dynamical system is
discussed. There are several mathematical methods for such stochastic dynamical systems
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(Gardiner, 1985; Schuster, 2002). Here, stochastic differential equations are introduced.
In one dimension, such a stochastic differential equation is given by
x˙(t) = f(x(t)) + g(x(t))ξ(t). (1.28)
In most cases, ξ(t) is assumed to be white Gaussian noise with autocorrelation function
〈x(t)x(t′)〉 = σ2δ(t−t′). There are two ways to analyze equation (1.28). It can be considered
as a differential equation which can be solved at least formally. However, this solution still
has stochastic character. Another possibility is to derive an equation for the evolution of the
probability density of the stochastic process.
Let us first concentrate on the first approach and begin with a special example, the Ornstein
Uhlenbeck process (Uhlenbeck and Ornstein, 1930). It is defined by
x˙(t) = −1
τ
x(t) +
1
τ
ξ(t) (1.29)
It can be shown that the Ornstein Uhlenbeck process is the only stationary Gaussian Markov
process (Doob, 1942). For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to a process with initial condition
x(0) = 0. The formal solution of (1.29) with this initial condition reads
x(t) =
1
τ
e−t/τ
∫ t
0
es/τξ(s)ds. (1.30)
Integrals over stochastic processes as this one have to be treated with much care. The math-
ematical precise formulation of
∫
ξ(s)ds is
∫
dW (s), where W (s) is the Wiener process.
Only stochastic integrals with respect to this process are well defined. The conventional
definitions of integrals as e.g. the Riemann integral are no longer valid. Two distinct ap-
proaches have been defined: If the problem is discrete in time and the differential equation
is only an approximation, the Ito integral widely used in financial mathematics is the cor-
rect description (Gardiner, 1985; Deutsch, 2004). In physics, where fluctuations are usually
correlated over finite length and time scales (Traulsen et al., 2004a), the Stratonovich inte-
gral is the correct mathematical formulation. However, as long as the noise is only additive,
i.e. if g((x(t)) does not depend on x(t), both mathematical approaches lead to the same re-
sults. From (1.30) the average value of the Ornstein Uhlenbeck process can be computed as
〈x(t)〉 = 0. For the autocorrelation function we find omitting the non-stationary terms and
using 〈x(t)x(t′)〉 = σ2δ(t− t′)
〈x(t)x(t′)〉 = σ
2
2τ
e|t−t
′|/τ . (1.31)
Hence, the variance of the stationary solution reads 〈x(t)x(t)〉 = σ2
2τ
. The approach to solve
the stochastic differential equation directly leads to a stochastic process. The properties of
this process can be computed directly.
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The second approach is to define an evolution equation for the probabilities of the process.
For the general stochastic differential equation (1.28), a so called Fokker-Planck equation can
be derived (Gardiner, 1985)
P˙ (x) = − ∂
∂t
(
f(x) +
σ2
2
g(x)g′(x)
)
P (x) +
1
2
∂2
∂t2
σ2g(x)2P (x) (1.32)
The solution of this equation yields the development of the probabilities. For example, for
constant g(x) and vanishing f(x) it yields the famous diffusion equation. Often, a stationary
solution is considered. For P˙ = 0 a probability current can be defined that has to be constant
in x such that the right hand side vanishes. Arguments on the boundary conditions of the
system often lead to the conclusion that this probability current has to be zero and a detailed
solution is possible. For the Ornstein Uhlenbeck process, the stationary solution is a Gaus-
sian with variance σ2
2τ
. This variance has also been found in the direct approach used above.
In (Traulsen et al., 2004b), the stationary solution of the Fokker Planck equation is used to
compute the average payoff of a population with adaptive selection rate.
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1.5.1 Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation
Studies of public goods games as the Prisoner’s Dilemma have often been focused on the
effects of memory (Lindgren, 1991; Hauert and Schuster, 1997; Hauert, 1999). Direct reci-
procity based on the memory of previous interactions can be very effective in order to induce
cooperation. However, memory can only be taken into account when repeated interactions
are restricted to few interaction partners. In addition, memory does only work if the opponent
is not met for the first time. Therefore, additional mechanisms that induce cooperation have
been proposed, as indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b), kin selection (Hamil-
ton, 1964a,b), group selection (Maynard Smith, 1964, 1976; Wilson, 1975) or similarity
based mechanisms (Riolo et al., 2001). These similarity based mechanism are subject to this
thesis.
However, it is controversial whether cooperation can arise from external traits that are
visible to others at all. Dawkins (1976) introduced the famous green beard effect as a thought
experiment in sociobiology: Consider a gene that confers on its bearer not only a green beard
(or any other visible trait), but also the instinct to help others with green beards. Individuals
with such a gene would effectively form a self-serving group, and the gene would spread
in the population. However, the idea of a gene that simultaneously produces a signal and a
behavior for the signaler is not easy to accept. Any mutation that leads to a green beard, but
not to the tendency to cooperate, is advantageous and cooperation would break down rapidly.
Hence, it is not clear whether such a cooperation can arise at all.
R. Riolo, M. Cohen and R. Axelrod (Riolo et al., 2001) introduce a more plausible model
in which individuals simply like others that are similar to themselves (Sigmund and Nowak,
2001). They are not allowed to cheat, i.e. they always help others that are very similar to
themselves. If this requirement is relaxed, the system reduces to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Such a similarity based cooperation can be induced by cultural tags, as clothing, club mem-
berships, or religious beliefs. In the simulations of Riolo et al. , each individual has a tag
τ ∈ [0, 1]. An individual i provides help to another individual j only if the difference be-
tween their tags is smaller than some tolerance threshold Ti of i, |τi − τj | ≤ Ti. If an
individual provides help to another one, it incurs a cost c, while the other one gains a benefit
b. Individuals reproduce with a probability proportional to their payoffs. In order to maintain
variability, additional mutations are included. These mutations have a significant influence
on the dynamics of the system. Mutations of the tolerance level are realized by introducing
a probability distribution around the old tolerance. As no negative tolerance thresholds are
allowed, this leads to an increase of the tolerance on average. Hence, there is a net drift from
intolerant to tolerant strategies. In order to determine the effect of this drift, it is included
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in the well mixed system (Traulsen and Schuster, 2003) as well as in the spatially extended
system (Traulsen and Claussen, 2004).
The model of Riolo et al. has been criticized, since agents are forced to cooperate with
each other (Roberts and Sherratt, 2002; Hauert, 2002b). In Dawkin’s picture, any mutation
that maintains the green beard, but eliminates the tendency to help others with this trait
would easily spread and abandon this kind of similarity based cooperation. In this way, the
title of the paper of Riolo et al., “Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity” is misleading.
However, the mechanism that maintains cooperation within a group does not necessarily have
to be the same as the mechanism that induces cooperation between groups. An individual
could take a tag as a first estimation, the cooperation between individuals from the same
group could as well be induced by direct or indirect reciprocity or even different mechanisms.
Although the model of Riolo et al. is interesting from a conceptual point of view, it
does not allow any insights into the driving mechanisms, as it relies solely on computer
simulations. However, a detailed analytical description of the model is not possible. Hence,
there is a need for a minimal model that allows for an analytical solution. Such minimal
models can be very helpful in order to identify the underlying mechanisms that drive the
phenomena observed in more complicated models.
Such a minimal model motivated by the work of Riolo et al. has been developed in this
thesis. In an initial step, the number of different strategies is reduced. This simplification
allows to formulate an evolution equation for the probabilities to find a certain strategies in
a well mixed system instead of simulating a finite population. Sigmund and Nowak (2001)
argued that any spatial distribution would be an obstacle for cooperation. They expected a
spatial segregation of different group supporting only others of their own kind. Our simplifi-
cation allows to analyze this in detail.
The number of possible tags, which is basically unbounded in the model of Riolo et al., has
been reduced to two only, red and blue. Hence, it makes only sense to define two tolerance
levels. Agents can either cooperate with everybody, T = 1, or only with others with the
same tag, T = 0. In the next step, symmetric interactions are introduced. If two agents are
paired, each of them has the possibility to support the other or not. A cooperation results in
a cost c for the donor and a benefit b for his partner. The game is described by the payoff
matrix depicted in Table 1.1.
As in the model of Riolo et al. (2001), agents always cooperate with others with their own
tag. What happens if this requirement is relaxed? If intolerant agents do not cooperate at all,
the tags lose their meaning: tolerant agents cooperate with everybody. They receive b − c
for interactions with other tolerant agents, regardless if they have a blue or red tag. If they
encounter an intolerant agent, they pay −c. Intolerant agents, on the other hand, receive b if
they interact with tolerant agents. They will refuse to cooperate with other intolerant agents,
leading to the payoff 0. Hence, the payoff matrix describes exactly the Prisoner’s Dilemma
1.5 Survey of the Publications 33
(Tag,T ) (red,1) (blue,1) (red,0) (blue,0)
(red,1) b-c b-c b-c -c
(blue,1) b-c b-c -c b-c
(red,0) b-c b b-c 0
(blue,0) b b-c 0 b-c
.
Table 1.1: Payoff matrix of the minimal model for similarity based cooperation.
if intolerant agents do not cooperate at all, making the differences between tags vanish. If
unconditional defectors are present in addition to the other strategies, they dominate both
other strategies. Hence, cooperation will not evolve. Recently, Axelrod et al. (2004) have
shown by computer simulations that in spatial systems, the intolerant strategy or ethnocentric
strategy can survive and lead to higher levels of cooperation than in spatial systems without
any tags.
This simplified model has been used to analyze similarity based cooperation on a spatial
lattice by numerical simulations. The analytical methods discussed in 1.3 cannot be trans-
fered to this system, since they are designed primarily for two strategies only, while the
minimal model consists of four strategies. The degree of segregation in this model has been
quantified numerically using correlation lengths and the spatial dissimilarity index (Duncan
and Duncan, 1955). Segregation has also been discussed in the famous paper of Schelling
(1971). However, Schelling assumed that segregation is a natural desire of the agents. In our
model, segregation arises naturally from the interplay of similarity and mutual cooperation.
In the next step, the drift from intolerant to tolerant strategies discussed above is included
in the model. In the spatially extended system, this drift can be realized as a local update
mechanism: If all agents in the neighborhood are of the same group, an agent switches to the
tolerant strategy. This reasoning leads to a cyclic dominance of strategies: A red intolerant
cluster becomes tolerant due to this local drift. Once these agents are tolerant, intolerant
blue agents can invade, leading to a blue intolerant cluster. In the next step, the local drift
makes this cluster tolerant. Red intolerant clusters invade and the cycle starts again, see Fig.
1.3. This cyclic dominance leads to the emergence of spiral waves in the spatially extended
system.
In addition, mechanisms to overcome segregation have been discussed. The basic question
is, what ingredients are necessary to create a population that cooperates mutually across
segregation borders. In this way, cooperation between groups could be established and the
group membership would lose its importance. As a local drift towards more tolerance does
not establish cooperation in the system, additional mechanisms are necessary. It turned out
that two features have to be present in a system with synchronous update in order to create
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Figure 1.3: Cyclic dominance of the strategies due to the population dynamics and the drift
from intolerant to tolerant strategies. Intolerant red clusters become tolerant due
to the drift. Red tolerant clusters are attacked by blue intolerant agents, which
transform to tolerant agents again. Finally, red intolerant agents can invade again.
a segregated cluster of tolerant agents: Agents need the ability to become tolerant once they
are not exploited. In addition, they have to be able to decrease their tolerance when they are
likely to be exploited. This reminds of the Tit for Tat strategy of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with
memory (Axelrod, 1984): This strategy has the ability to punish others, but also the ability
to forgive and return to cooperation. Such a strategy leads to a segregated system of red and
blue agents. However, now agents cooperate across segregation borders.
1.5.2 Minimal model for tag-based cooperation
The minimal model for similarity based cooperation described in 1.5.1 is not only useful to
analyze spatially extended systems. In well mixed systems, it allows an analytical description
of the dynamics of the system.
The computer simulations of Riolo et al. (2001) showed characteristic oscillations of the
average tolerance, called “Tides of tolerance” by Sigmund and Nowak (2001). The tolerance
increases slowly until a wave of intolerance starts spreading reducing the overall cooperation.
Sigmund and Nowak conjectured that the upward drift of the tolerance was induced by a
combination of mutation pressure and kin selection. However, an explicit explanation of
this phenomenon has been lacking. No waves appear if mutations of the tolerance or the
tags are omitted (Traulsen and Schuster, 2003). As the simulations in Riolo et al. (2001)
consider a mixed population, it is possible to construct a mean-field theory for the dynamics.
In this mean field theory, an evolution equation for the probabilities of the strategies can be
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introduced instead of simulating a finite population. For this purpose, the replicator dynamics
discussed in 1.4.2 is chosen. As the dynamical system described by the replicator dynamics
cannot be solved analytically in detail, only the stability of fixed points can be discussed. For
this purpose, the fixed points have to be determined from a set of four equations describing
the evolution of the probabilities for the four strategies. The stability of these fixed point is
then determined by a linear stability analysis as described in 1.4.3.
We find stable fixed points of the evolutionary dynamics corresponding to Nash equilibria
for the game given by the payoff matrix shown in Table 1.1: If the population consists either
of blue or red players only, everybody cooperates and the frequencies of the strategies no
longer change. These fixed points are only stable if the fraction of intolerant agents is higher
than the cooperation cost divided by the benefit for cooperation. The basins of attraction of
the stable red and blue fixed points are separated by a linear plane. Points on this separatrix
converge to the mixed Nash equilibrium in which only intolerant agents - 50% red and 50%
blue - exist. A linear stability analysis of the mixed Nash equilibrium shows that it is unstable
in one direction and stable in the remaining two directions. It turns out that the unstable
direction of the Nash mixed equilibrium is the normal of the separatrix dividing the basins of
attraction of the red and blue fixed points. This can be shown straightforward by analyzing
the dynamics on this plane.
However, the Nash equilibria given by the red and blue fixed points are not strict and the
fixed points are hence not Evolutionary Stable Strategies (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973).
Consider a population of red intolerant agents only. As red tolerant agent receive the same
payoff, neutral mutations can increase the fraction of these agents. If the fraction of tolerant
agents is high enough, blue intolerant agents can invade the population, leading to a blue in-
tolerant population. Here, the cycle continues with the roles of red and blue tags exchanged.
In order to include the average effect of such neutral mutations into the replicator dynamics,
we introduced a drift from intolerant to tolerant strategies. The fraction of red tolerant agents
is increased by transforming a fraction ε of the intolerant red agents to tolerant red agents and
equivalently for the blue agents. This drift leads the system to unstable fixed points, hence,
oscillations emerge from this drift. These oscillations are the deterministic equivalents to the
“Tides of tolerance” observed by Riolo et al. (2001). The drift towards more tolerance leads
to a cyclic dominance in the model: Red intolerant populations become tolerant via this drift,
the game dynamics transforms the red tolerant population to a blue intolerant one. Here, the
drift increases the tolerance again leading to a blue tolerant population, which is, in turn,
attacked by red intolerant agents. The mechanism is the same as in the spatially extended
system, only the nature of the drift is different.
The minimal model allows to compute the stability of the fixed points in the model ana-
lytically even in the presence of this drift. The stability depends on the drift parameter ε and
the cost of cooperation c, see (Traulsen and Schuster, 2003) for details. If these parameters
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are varied, the stability of the fixed points is altered and different bifurcations are observed.
In particular, the transition to the oscillating state induced by the drift towards tolerance is a
saddle node bifurcation with a linear perturbation term. In this bifurcation, a small channel
is opened through which the trajectory crosses the separatrix. Depending on the cooperation
costs, different dynamical regimes can be observed. For very small cooperation costs, the
drift leads to a stabilization of fixed points that are unstable for ε = 0. These fixed points ap-
pear if all players cooperate with every other players, regardless of their group membership.
For higher cooperation costs, a single attractor can be found in the system. This attractor is
found for a wide range of cooperation costs. For even higher costs, the drift cannot longer
drive the system through the separatrix and two attractors appear. In one of them, red agents
dominate and in the other one blue agents. When c is increased further, these cyclic attractors
vanish in a Hopf bifurcation and new fixed points that are created by the drift become stable.
Finally, these fixed points join with the mixed Nash equilibrium in a supercritical pitchfork
bifurcation, which is the only stable fixed point for very high cooperation costs. Details on
these transitions can be found in (Traulsen and Schuster, 2003)
A cyclic dominance as the one induced by the drift from intolerant to tolerant strategies
often leads to closed trajectories in mean field theories. The most prominent example is the
simple game “Rock-Paper-Scissors” discussed in 1.4.2. A particular interesting example are
asymmetric conflicts. In (Traulsen et al., 2004b) it is shown that oscillations in these systems
can be dampened in such a way that one player gains an increased payoff.
1.5.3 Stochastic gain in population dynamics
Mean field theories of cyclic games show oscillations in time: The cyclic dominance of the
strategies leads to an oscillation of the fraction of the different strategies. From a physicist’s
point of view, it is natural to ask how the “energy” of these oscillations can be extracted. An
interesting example are asymmetric conflicts. In these game theoretic systems, two players
with different roles interact. This could be attackers and defenders, buyers and sellers, or
males and females. One example for an asymmetric conflict is the game of “matching pen-
nies”. Consider a town with two pubs. Everybody goes to one of them each night. Person A
wants to meet B every night, while B tries to avoid meeting A. This situation can be viewed
as a game between A and B: If A and B do the same, A wins and B will choose differently in
the future. If the chose different options, A loses and A will switch to the same option as B
again. This leads to a cyclic dominance again. In biology, a reasoning over costs of parental
care leads to the name “battle of the sexes” for this game (Maynard Smith, 1982).
These asymmetric conflicts are especially interesting, as one can easily analyze situations
in which one population of players has a slightly different adaptation mechanism than the
population in the second role. A first question is how the oscillations induced by the cyclic
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dominance can be exploited by one population. This way, the oscillations would be damp-
ened and the average payoff of this population would increase. In this situation, it is not
enough if one population simple has a different selection or learning rate. In this case, their
strategies oscillate with different frequencies, but the dynamics is still periodic. A simple
approach is to introduce a selection rate that changes with the success of the population.
If the population is in a good state, the selection becomes weaker. The escape from unfa-
vorable states is accelerated by higher selection rates. Such a behavior is motivated by the
“win stay—lose shift” strategy from reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 2000). In
mathematical terms, the selection rate η can be written as
η = η0 (1− tanh [α∆pi]) , (1.33)
where η0 is a base selection rate, α is a perception ability and ∆pi is the difference between
the average payoffs of two interacting populations. For α → 0 the selection rate remains
constant. For α → ∞ the population is not changed by selection if ∆pi > 0, while it
evolves with a rate 2η0. It has been shown that such a learning rate can stabilize the mixed
Nash equilibrium in the game of matching pennies (Traulsen et al., 2004b). In particular,
the Nash equilibrium is stabilized in such a way that one population has an increased payoff
when the Nash equilibrium is approached. However, the Nash equilibrium is not always
approached in systems with adaptive selection rates. For example, in the game of “Rock-
Paper-Scissors”, trajectories exist on which ∆pi = 0, e.g. where both populations use exactly
the same strategies. This has previously been conjectured (Sato et al., 2002).
The solution of the coupled replicator dynamics of this system shows that the system al-
ways stays at the mixed Nash equilibrium which has been stabilized by the adaptive selection
rates. In realistic systems, disturbances are expected which lead the system away from this
fixed point again. For small fluctuations, the system stays near the Nash equilibrium, where
both populations have the same success. Very strong fluctuations dominate over the selec-
tion mechanism and adaptive selection rates do not have any influence. Intermediate levels
of fluctuations, however, can be exploited: If the time interval between large disturbances is
long enough such that the system settles back at the stable fixed points, these fluctuations can
be exploited. There are several sources for such fluctuations. They can result from errors of
players, changes in the environment or external shocks. Randomness can also arise from fi-
nite populations (Claussen and Traulsen, 2005) or from payoff matrices with random entries
(Eriksson and Lindgren, 2001). We follow the usual approach to include noise as a Langevin
term to the usual replicator equations (Foster and Young, 1990; Fudenberg and Harris, 1992;
Cabrales, 2000). In this way, the usual deterministic replicator equation is replaced by a
stochastic differential equation, as discussed in 1.4.3. These stochastic differential equations
are combined with adaptive selection rates in asymmetric conflicts. The adaptive selection
rates lead to the exploitation of such fluctuations. This effect has been found numerically in
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different games, as well in cyclic games as matching pennies and in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
For non-cyclic games, even a rough analytical approximation for the average payoff under
the influence of noise is possible (Traulsen et al., 2004b). In principle, the mechanism can
also be transferred to finite populations. For example, one could adapt the selection pressure
on one population in a Moran process, as introduced in (Nowak et al., 2004).
A mechanism that exploits fluctuations can in principle be applied to realize increased
earnings in real markets, which can under some circumstances be described by games. In
particular, the “Minority game” often serves as a model for a simple market (Challet and
Zhang, 1997; Challet et al., 2000). So what hinders us from applying this mechanism at the
stock market and becoming rich? First, our model assumes an infinite population size and
introduces artificially external disturbances. It is not clear whether such kind of fluctuations
are present and if they are stronger than fluctuations from an inherent noise arising from finite
populations (Claussen and Traulsen, 2005). However, First numerical simulations indicated
that the stochastic gain effect can also be observed in finite populations.
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Similarity-based cooperation and spatial segregation
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We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of the
coplayer, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description
recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a
two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood.
The system shows a strong segregation independent of parameters. The introduction of a local conversion
mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial
game. In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending
on both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in
the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes
unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.70.046128 PACS number(s): 02.50.Le, 87.23.2n, 89.65.2s
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of complex systems with game-theoretic inter-
actions has recently attracted a lot of attention in statistical
physics, biology, behavioral sciences, and economics. In
contrast to standard game theory [1] the focus has recently
been on evolutionary game theory [2–6]. In particular, the
prisoner’s dilemma [7] has become the metaphor for the evo-
lution of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals. If
the game is not repeated, the dominating strategy is to defect.
However, repeated interactions of individuals memorizing
the past can establish high levels of cooperation from direct
reciprocity [7]. Reciprocity works also indirectly if individu-
als can observe the behavior of others and cooperate with
respect to the reputation of others [8,9].
Real world interactions are often restricted to small local
groups. Realizing that territoriality can have strong influ-
ences on the evolution of cooperation, Axelrod proposed the
study of a spatially extended prisoner’s dilemma [7]. Nowak
and May studied a cellular automaton based on the prisoner’s
dilemma [10]. They found that reducing interactions to small
local groups can promote cooperation, as cooperative clus-
ters minimize their contacts with neighboring defectors.
Their paper initiated an intensive research on spatially ex-
tended games on two-dimensional lattices [11–14] and net-
work topologies [15–18]. However, spatial structure does not
necessarily lead to an increased level of cooperation [19].
Another mechanism that can promote cooperation among
related individuals is kin selection [20]. Although kin selec-
tion is controversial in biology, indications for similarity-
based interaction mechanisms have been found on the mo-
lecular level [21,22]. Riolo et al. introduced a model in
which agents are equipped with traits that allow one to dis-
criminate between different groups of players [23]. It has
been argued that the model is of limited biological relevance,
as agents are forced to cooperate within their own group
[24,25]. However, cooperation can evolve from a combina-
tion of kin selection and reciprocity, which can promote such
an intragroup cooperation. The mechanism that leads to co-
operation does not have to be the same for interaction within
groups and between groups. In spatially extended systems
agents can only prosper if they get sufficient support from
their neighbors. Hence, cooperation based on similarity will
lead to a segregation of different groups in spatially extended
system [26].
Although the importance of group memberships is
stressed in the social sciences [27], segregation is usually not
desired in social systems. We raise the question on the mini-
mal requirements for agents in order to avoid this kind of
segregation. We introduce a forecast rule that helps to over-
come the segregation, leading to a population in which
agents support others regardless of their group membership.
The corresponding spatial pattern can be stabilized by a lin-
ear global feedback.
II. DEFINITION OF THE MODEL
The evolution of cooperation in large populations is usu-
ally analyzed in systems based on public goods games [28].
For each cooperation a cost ci.0 depending on the tag of
the player is incurred which results in a benefit b.ci for the
interaction partner. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to
two groups of agents only, red and blue. In every group there
are two kinds of players. Intolerant players support only oth-
ers with the same tag sT=0d. Tolerant players sT=1d support
any other player, regardless of his group membership. The
payoff of every player depends on the strategies of his inter-
action partners. We introduce n1r , n0r , n1b, and n0b for the num-
ber of interaction partners that are tolerant red, intolerant red,
tolerant blue, and intolerant blue, respectively. The payoff
can be written as
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Psxd =5
sb − crdsn0r + n1r + n1bd − crn0b for x = sred,1d ,
sb − crdsn0r + n1rd + bn1b for x = sred,0d ,
sb − cbdsn0b + n1b + n1rd − crn0b for x = sblue,1d ,
sb − cbdsn0b + n1bd + bn1r for x = sblue,0d .
6
s1d
In the following we restrict ourselves to cr=cb=c. The sys-
tem with crÞcb is analyzed in Sec. IV. In a single interaction
the payoff is b−c if both players cooperate with each other,
−c indicating that the player has been exploited and b indi-
cating that the player has exploited his interaction partner.
The payoff is zero when both players refused to cooperate.
The tolerant strategies are dominated by the intolerant strat-
egies, as the payoffs of the T=1 strategies are never higher
than the payoffs of the T=0 strategies. In well-mixed sys-
tems without spatial structure this leads to bistability. One
group becomes extinct and the other group dominates in the
two evolutionary-stable Nash equilibria with intolerant play-
ers of one tag only. An alternating dominance of both groups
can be generated if there is a drift towards more tolerance
[29].
III. SPATIALLY EXTENDED SYSTEM
Players are arranged on a two-dimensional regular cubic
lattice with periodic boundary conditions. The system size is
N=L3L. Each player interacts with his eight nearest neigh-
bors (Moore neighborhood)—i.e., n0r +n1r +n0b+n1b=8. After
interacting with all the neighbors, the players update their
strategy synchronously. This corresponds to discrete, non-
overlapping generations. Strategies are updated due to the
deterministic “best takes over” rule [30]; i.e., i switches to
the strategy among its nearest neighbors that reached the
highest payoff:
si
t+1
= s j
t where j = argmax
jPNNsid
P j
t
. s2d
If several nearest neighbors with different strategies have the
same success, players keep as much of their identity as pos-
sible. Choosing between switching tag or tolerance, players
will switch their tolerance. This ensures that the update rule
remains deterministic. However, these additional rules apply
only in very rare cases. Note that the new strategy of a player
depends on the strategies in his 535 neighborhood, as the
payoffs in his 333 neighborhood are involved. Self-
interactions can be neglected in our case. Hence, the game
can be described as a deterministic cellular automaton with
424 update rules. This is in contrast to the usual prisoner’s
dilemma, where “only” 224 update rules are necessary [10].
A modification of the cooperation cost leads to a modifica-
tion of the update rules; see the Appendix for details. The
extension of the usual prisoner’s dilemma to four strategies
complicates the application of many tools for spatial games,
as pair approximation [13,14,31], fundamental clusters
[32,33], or mapping to Ising models [12].
A. Segregation in the basic system
As the tolerant strategies can easily be exploited by intol-
erant players from the other group, they can only survive
with sufficient support from surrounding players (cf. Fig. 1).
Hence, the majority of players will be intolerant when the
system reaches a static state. A 333 cluster of intolerant
agents can always survive, as the player in the center has the
highest possible payoff in his neighborhood. In general, a
tolerant player not interacting with intolerant players of the
other tag can always survive. If he interacts with such play-
ers, the cooperation cost determines which kind of clusters
are stable.
As expected [26], the system shows a strong segregation.
Segregation between different agents in cellular automata
has already been observed in the seminal paper of Schelling
[34]. However, in our case segregation is not directly based
on observable traits of others, but on mutual support. Most of
the players are intolerant. Players that support others across
the segregation borders are always exploited; they cannot
survive if the cooperation cost is too high. This is consistent
with the mean-field theory [29], where only fixed points with
intolerant players of one tag are stable.
The situation is slightly different if stochastic mutations
are included, as the system no longer becomes static. Toler-
ance mutations increase the fraction of the tolerant agents, as
there is no equilibrium between tolerant and intolerant
agents. The tolerance mutations lead towards such an equi-
librium, while the population dynamics works against this
equilibrium. Mutations of the tags can also destabilize clus-
ters, as they introduce new agents into an environment that
cannot produce such agents by the population dynamics.
FIG. 1. (Color online) Basic system without mutations. Only ten
generations after a random initialization the system reaches a static
state. The tolerant players can only survive if they have sufficient
support from their neighbors sc=0.3, b=1.0, L=80d.
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This leads to the disappearance of small clusters (cf. Fig. 2).
The degree of segregation can be quantified utilizing the
“spatial dissimilarity index” D [35], defined as
D =
1
2oj UNr
j
Nr
−
Nb
j
Nb
U , s3d
where Nr
i sNb
i d is the number of red (blue) agents in subre-
gion i and Nr sNbd is the total number of red (blue) agents.
Choosing a 333 neighborhood as subregion we find D
=0.715±0.001 sc=0.3, N=1000d indicating a strong degree
of segregation, compared to
D =
1
9
1
512oj=0
9 S9i Du2j − 9u = 35128 < 0.273
for a random population. D decreases less than 5%
when c is increased (D=0.729±0.001 for c=0.05 and
D=0.707±0.001 for c=0.95).
Another possible measure for the segregation is the cor-
relation length l. For simplicity, the correlations have only
been computed for one direction. The probability that an
agent in the distance of d has the same color decays as p
~e−d/l. For c=0.3 we find a correlation length of l
=5.85±0.02. The correlation length decreases slightly with
increasing c (l=6.25±0.02 for c=0.05 and l=5.65±0.02
for c=0.95). As discussed above, mutations lead to the elimi-
nation of small clusters. Consequently, the correlation length
is increased by mutations. After 100 time steps we find l
=8.95±0.03 (c=0.3; tags and tolerances are mutated with
probability 2%), which is significantly higher than the corre-
lation length in the system without mutations. The segrega-
tion properties are not altered if an asynchronous update is
applied instead.
Overall, the segregation properties and correlation length
are governed by the length defined by the size of the neigh-
borhood window. They are only marginally influenced by the
cooperation cost c.
B. Emergence of spiral waves from
a local conversion mechanism
The well-mixed system was analyzed rigorously under the
influence of biased conversions towards tolerance [29].
These biased conversions show an alternating dominance of
both groups in the mixed system.
Let us now introduce a local conversion mechanism that
promotes tolerance in a similar way. We assume that an agent
in a neighborhood consisting only of players of his own tag
becomes tolerant, if he did not switch his strategy in the
same time step due to selection. As only intolerant players
utilize the ability to distinguish between tags this could be
motivated by assuming some costs for this cognition system.
These conversions lead to a rock-paper-scissors-like cycle
with four strategies: If the neighbors are red, red agents be-
come tolerant. In a red tolerant neighborhood intolerant blue
agents have the highest payoff. If these dominate the neigh-
borhood, the blue players should switch to the tolerant strat-
egy. Finally, in such a neighborhood the intolerant red agents
gain the highest payoff. This in contrast to [36], where cyclic
dominance is explicitly included in a system with asynchro-
nous update.
This cycle leads to the emergence of rotating spirals. The
arms of these spirals are traveling waves, as in the game of
rock, paper, scissors [37,38] or in public goods games with
volunteering [14,39]. The front of such a wave consists of
intolerant agents; these are followed by tolerant agents of the
same tag (cf. Fig. 3). These players can be exploited by
intolerant players with a different tag; hence a new front with
a different tag can invade.
In the case of asynchronous update spirals are replaced by
larger structures moving through the system. However, the
mechanism for the movement of these structures is the same
as for the spiral waves.
To locate the spiral tips quantitatively, the strategies
sr ,1d , sr ,0d , sb ,1d, and sb ,0d are associated with discrete
indices 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Interpreting those as four
possible angles of a two-dimensional vector field, the curl
can be calculated from a counterclockwise Stokes path on a
232 block. For a continuous field of phases f the topologi-
cal charge of a closed path G is defined by
q =
1
2pRG ¹Wf · drW . s4d
In our case, both space and phase are discrete; the phase is
measured in units of p /2. Along the Stokes path we compute
the phase differences
FIG. 2. (Color online) Basic system with mutations. With 2%
probability, the tag and tolerance are modified independently. As in
the system without mutations, the different tags segregate in space.
One hundred generations after a random initialization, the majority
of small clusters seen in the system without mutations (cf. Fig. 1)
has vanished due to the destabilizing effect of the mutations. This
leads to a longer correlation length; see text. Colors are as in Fig. 1
sc=0.3, b=1.0, L=80d.
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Df1 = xi+1,j − xi,j ,
Df2 = xi+1,j+1 − xi+1,j ,
Df3 = xi,j+1 − xi+1,j+1,
Df4 = xi,j − xi,j+1. s5d
In the discrete case a phase difference of two steps, or angle
p, may occur and consistently can be interpreted as a zero
contribution to the Stokes integral (leading to the possibility
of half-valued partial charges as discussed below). Thus the
phase differences are mapped on differences Dqi according
to Table I. The topological charge is given by q=Dq1+Dq2
+Dq3+Dq4. A typical spiral tip consists of two equal topo-
logical charges q= ± 12 in nearby positions. In the stationary
regime, the generic case is a pairing of two spirals with dif-
ferent chiralities—i.e., different topological charges
q= ±1—near each other. For completeness, it should be
noted that the resulting curl field is defined on the dual lattice
shifted from the original one by a vector s 12 ,
1
2 d.
A comparison between the strategy distribution and the
corresponding charge distribution is shown in Fig. 4.
For a random initialization we find a topological charge
density of krl=0.219±0.003, which is consistent with the
theoretical average value for independent topological charges
krl= 732 =0.21875. The spatial game dynamics quickly re-
duces the initial topological charge density. However, topo-
logical charges are generated and annihilated in an irregular
manner until the system reaches a stationary state; see Fig. 4.
IV. ASYMMETRIC SPATIAL SYSTEM
It seems natural to assume that the two different groups
can have two different costs of cooperation. For different
costs cr and cb in Eq. (1) we find several distinct dynamical
regimes, as dominance of red players, spiral waves, etc. (cf.
Fig. 5 for details).
Three different classes of transitions can be observed in
Fig. 5. As in the symmetric game, the update rule is modified
if one of the cooperation costs crosses a threshold cost as
explained in the Appendix. Such transitions are vertical and
horizontal lines in Fig. 5—e.g., the black dotted line in re-
gion sBrd at cr=
1
3b. Note that the transitions shown in Fig. 9
(curve L) can be observed on the diagonal cr=cb in Fig. 5. A
second kind of threshold is determined by cr /cb. These
thresholds govern the dynamical behavior and divide the
phase plane in Fig. 5 into seven distinct regions. For
cb /cr.
8
3 red agents dominate the population; for cb /cr.
8
3
FIG. 3. (Color online) System with local conversions towards
tolerance. Colors are as in Fig. 1. Agents become tolerant if their
new neighborhood has the same color, this leads to a rock-paper-
scissors-like cycle. Spirals that generate traveling waves appear sc
=0.3, b=1.0, L=80d.
TABLE I. Mapping of phase differences Dfi to charge differ-
ences Dqi.
Dfi −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3
Dqi +
1
4 0 −
1
4 0 +
1
4 0 −
1
4
FIG. 4. (Color online) Topological charges: Colors are as in Fig.
1. (b) shows the spatial distribution of charges for the strategy dis-
tribution shown in (a). The sign + s−d indicates a topological charge
of q= + 12 sq=−
1
2 d. Full charges are not stable and disappear imme-
diately after their generation. (c) shows a typical time development
of the average charge density krl. Initially, krl drops rapidly. As
topological charges are generated and annihilated, the charge den-
sity fluctates until the system reaches a stationary state sL=50d.
A. TRAULSEN AND J. C. CLAUSSEN PHYSICAL REVIEW E 70, 046128 (2004)
046128-4
Publications 45
stationary clusters of intolerant blue agents can survive. At
cb /cr=2 traveling waves can appear which suppress station-
ary clusters of intolerant blue agents at cb /cr,
8
5 . However,
if the cooperation costs are sufficiently high, one group can
take over the whole population after a transient period [re-
gion sDrd in Fig. 5]. For cb,cr the roles of red and blue are
exchanged. Finally, we have a third class of transitions which
is given by linear equations cb=a+bcr. Here, the transition
threshold is given by a certain slope Dcb /Dcr=const as for
the second kind of transitions. However, now one of the
costs has to exceed a certain threshold as for the first kind of
transitions—e.g., the white dotted line in region sDd of Fig. 5
is given by cb=
1
4b+
3
8cr.
It is also possible to describe the phases in the asymmetric
system by topological charge densities introduced in Sec.
III B (cf. Fig. 6).
V. FORECAST RULE
Here, we return to a system where both cooperation costs
are the same. Let us assume that the local conversion rule
towards tolerance is based on the new strategies of the neigh-
bors and applies also for players that switched their strategies
due to selection. Hence, now the update depends on the strat-
egies in a 737 neighborhood. Such a mechanism can be
viewed as a primitive forecast. Players become tolerant if
they expect their neighborhood to cooperate with them in the
next generation. Even in this setting the local conversion rule
leads to the emergence of spiral waves.
It is straightforward to add an equivalent mechanism that
increases the fraction of intolerant agents. Tolerant agents
can become intolerant in order to protect themselves against
exploiters that refuse to cooperate. Therefore, we decrease
the tolerance of an agent if at least two neighbors will prob-
ably exploit him in the next time step.
A. Cooperative fixed point
For c,0.4b we observe cooperation across the segrega-
tion borders for synchronous update. For asynchronous up-
dates this fixed point does not become stable. The forecast
rule leads to a stable coexistence of red and blue tolerant
agents that provide help for everybody in their neighborhood
(cf. Fig. 7). As a discrimination between different agents is
no longer necessary, this can be seen as a primitive mecha-
nism to overcome segregation. However, although the behav-
ior of all agents is independent of the tags, the different tags
are still segregated in space. The typical correlation lengths
FIG. 5. Asymmetric system: fraction of red agents (encoded in a
grayscale) in dependence of the cooperation costs cb and cr. In
region sArd the population is dominated by red agents; for small cb
intolerant blue agents can survive. In region sBrd intolerant blue
players form channels in a sea of tolerant red agents. In sDrd red
tolerant agents dominate again. Region sEd shows spiral waves as
the symmetric game, cf. Fig. 3. Region sCrd shows coexistence of
spiral waves from sEd and channels from sBrd. For cb,cr the dy-
namics is the same with the role of red and blue agents exchanged.
Structures inside the regions are determined by changes of the up-
date rule. The borders of these structures, e.g. the dotted lines in
regions sDbd / sEd and sBrd, are given by linear equations cb=a
+bcr, see text for details (L=100, averages over 50 time steps and
100 independent realizations).
FIG. 6. Asymmetric system: average charge density in depen-
dence of the cooperation costs cb and cr. The regions are the same
as in Fig. 5. Topological charges can only be found when traveling
waves are present—i.e., in regions sCd and sEd. The absence of
topological charges corresponds to the dominance of one group in
the limit t→`. The highest charge densities are observed in the sCd
regions and in sEd near the diagonal cr=cb (L=100, averages over
50 time steps and 100 independent realizations).
SIMILARITY-BASED COOPERATION AND SPATIAL… PHYSICAL REVIEW E 70, 046128 (2004)
046128-5
Publications 46
are larger than in the system without conversion mecha-
nisms. For c=0.3 we find l=8.32±0.02. The spatial dis-
similarity index is only slightly higher; we observe
D=0.719±0.005. Surprisingly the mechanism that enables
agents to become intolerant increases the total fraction of
tolerant agents, as it helps to stabilize tolerant domains. It is
interesting that a mechanism that increases intolerance helps
to eliminate intolerance. However, the mechanism bears
some resemblance to the “tit-for-tat” strategy in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma [7], which punishes others for not coop-
erating, but can also forgive defectors reestablishing coop-
eration. One can even observe different stationary structures
that change periodically in which intolerant agents survive;
these resemble the “blinkers” in the “game of life” [40]. For
c.0.4b the system reaches a stationary state only in very
rare cases. However, parts of the system are still dominated
by tolerant agents. In the case of c.0.5b this is no longer
the case; here, intolerant agents are found in the whole sys-
tem.
Note that such a forecast rule cannot stabilize the coop-
erative fixed point in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma [10], as
defectors have always a higher payoff than neighboring co-
operators.
B. Feedback stabilization
For cooperation costs c.0.5b the tolerant fixed point is
unstable. However, we can enforce cooperative behavior by
global feedback on the cooperation costs. In social systems
this corresponds to adapting taxes with respect to the state of
the society. Specifying a desired fraction of tolerant agents
f tol! we update the cost depending on the current fraction of
tolerant agents f tolt as
FIG. 8. Time evolution of the system with linear feedback. Cost
of cooperation (gray) and fraction of tolerant agents (black). The
fraction of tolerant agents decreases rapidly when the cost reaches
the threshold c=0.5 sf tol! =0.8, a=0.01, c0=0.5, N=200d.
FIG. 9. Dependence of different order measures on the cost of cooperation, c, for four different update rules. (a) shows the fraction of
tolerant agents in the system. The donation rate—i.e., the fraction of interactions in which a player cooperated with his coplayer—is shown
in (b). The order measures are shown for the system without mutations sNd, with stochastic mutations sSd, with the local conversion
mechanism described in Sec. III B sLd, and with the forecast rule sFd from Sec. V. The sharp steps correspond to modifications of the update
rules (b=1.0, L=100, spatial averages over 50 independent realizations and 50 update steps after a transient period of 50 update steps).
FIG. 7. (Color online) System with forecast rule. Colors are as
in Fig. 1. Agents become tolerant if their neighborhood has the
same color and intolerant if at least two neighbors will refuse to
cooperate. This mechanism allows the coexistence of red and blue
tolerant agents; here, the intolerant agents have been eliminated by
the mechanism, leading to a static state sc=0.3, b=1.0, L=80d.
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ct+1 = ct + asf tol! − f tolt dct. s6d
For each f tol! , the cost fluctuates around a threshold that is
determined by a change of the update rule (cf. the Appen-
dix), as shown in Fig. 8 for f tol! =0.8. This mechanism can
stabilize points with f tol! ,1 even for c.0.5b. For each f tol!
the cost fluctuates around a threshold that is determined by a
change of the update rule (cf. the Appendix).
For the mean-field theory we have a fixed point for f tol
=1 [29], which is only stable for very low cooperation costs.
However, this fixed point cannot be stabilized with the linear
feedback from Eq. (6).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated spatial segregation, pattern forma-
tion, and control in a spatial version of a public goods game
with cooperation based on the similarity between players.
This type of model may establish a useful approach for a
large variety of economical and social systems, where agents
may act not only upon economical considerations, but also
based on similarity or group membership. Generalizations to
more detailed agents can be performed in a straightforward
manner, yet our four-state model already is capable of show-
ing different phase states from stationary segregation to com-
plex spatiotemporal behavior.
Particularly, it is interesting to note that a simple forecast
rule can help to overcome segregation and lead to a stable
pattern of cooperating agents, as regions with limited coop-
eration at the borders between groups are eliminated. How-
ever, the different groups are still segregated in space.
APPENDIX: INFLUENCE OF THE COST
OF COOPERATION
Due to the discrete nature of the total payoff, sharp steps
appear when the cost of cooperation, c, varies. As examples,
we consider the dependence of the fraction of tolerant agents,
f tol, and the donation rate—i.e. the fraction of cooperative
interactions—on the cost of cooperation (see Fig. 9). Due to
the symmetry between tags, the fraction of red and blue tol-
erant agents can be computed from the fraction of tolerant
agents, f tol /2, on average. In the same manner the fraction of
intolerant agents of each group can be computed as s1
− f told /2. The donation rate includes additional information
on the spatial distribution of the agents. The steps that are
observed in the order measures correspond to modifications
of the update rule, as described in [10]. The steps occur at the
same positions for all order measures. However, the step size
is different for the fraction of tolerant agents and the dona-
tion rate (see Fig. 9).
Consider a player x with a payoff Psxd and a second
player y with the payoff Psyd and a different strategy. If a
third player z with a payoff Pszd,Psxd , Psyd in the neigh-
borhood of these two players searches for the best strategy,
his update rule changes at c=c! if the sign of Psxd−Psyd
changes at c=c!. The corresponding values for c /b are given
by
Xbb − Xcc = Ybb − Ycc , sA1d
where 0øXb sYbdø8 is the number of agents that support
xsyd and 0øXc sYcdø8 is the number of agents that are
supported by xsyd. For the situation shown in Fig. 10 we find
for the center player Pszd=5b−8c, for his left neighbor
Psxd=6b−5c.Pszd, and for his right neighbor Psyd=8b
−8c.Pszd. Hence, we find a modification of the update rule
for
c! =
Xb − Yb
Xc − Yc
b =
2
3
b . sA2d
For c.c! the center player will switch tolerance and group
membership. Other transitions can be found in the same way,
although the method of fundamental clusters [33] is more
complicated due to the high number of possible configura-
tions.
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Example for a modification of the up-
date rule. Colors are as in Fig. 1. The numbers are the payoffs P for
this neighborhood. This situation is stable for cø2/3b, as the play-
ers with P=6b−5c that exploit the player in the center do not have
the maximum payoff P=8b−8c.
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Recently, Riolo et al. @Nature ~London! 414, 441 ~2001!# showed by computer simulations that cooperation
can arise without reciprocity when agents donate only to partners who are sufficiently similar to themselves.
One striking outcome of their simulations was the observation that the number of tolerant agents that support
a wide range of players was not constant in time, but showed characteristic fluctuations. The cause and
robustness of these tides of tolerance remained to be explored. Here we clarify the situation by solving a
minimal version of the model of Riolo et al. It allows us to identify a net surplus of random changes from
intolerant to tolerant agents as a necessary mechanism that produces these oscillations of tolerance, which
segregate different agents in time. This provides a new mechanism for maintaining different agents, i.e., for
creating biodiversity. In our model the transition to the oscillating state is caused by a saddle node bifurcation.
The frequency of the oscillations increases linearly with the transition rate from tolerant to intolerant agents.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.68.046129 PACS number~s!: 02.50.Le, 87.23.2n, 89.65.2s
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of cooperation in evolving populations
with exploitative individuals is still a challenging problem in
biological and social sciences. Most theories that explain co-
operation are based on direct reciprocity, as the famous iter-
ated prisoner’s dilemma @1#. Cooperation can also arise from
indirect reciprocity when agents help others only if these are
known to be sufficiently altruistic @2#. In most of these mod-
els a finite population of agents is simulated, pairs of agents
meet randomly as potential donator and receiver. A donation
involves some cost to the donor while it provides a larger
benefit to the receiver. Agents reproduce depending on their
payoffs after a certain number of such meetings. Obviously,
selfish individuals who do not donate would quickly spread
in the population if help is not channeled towards more co-
operative players. If agents do not meet repeatedly—as in a
large population—direct reciprocity does not work. Indirect
reciprocity can solve this problem when donations are given
only to those individuals who are known as sufficiently help-
ful. This mechanism effectively protects a cooperative popu-
lation against exploiters @2#.
Riolo et al. @3# introduced a model in which cooperation
is not based on reciprocity, but on similarity. In this model
donations are channeled towards individuals who are suffi-
ciently similar to the donator. To distinguish between differ-
ent groups of individuals every agent i has a tag t iP@0,1# .
School ties, club memberships, tribal costumes, or religious
creeds are all tags that induce cooperation. In addition,
agents have a tolerance threshold T i>0, which determines
the tag interval that the agent classifies as its own group. An
agent i donates to another agent j if their tags are sufficiently
similar, ut i2t ju<T i . The cost of such a donation for i is c
.0 while the benefit for j is b.c . For simplicity, b is nor-
malized to 1, since a multiplication of payoffs with a con-
stant factor does not change the game. Initially, the tag and
the tolerance threshold are uniformly distributed random
numbers. In each generation every agent acts as a potential
donor for P other agents chosen at random. Hence it is, on
average, also chosen P times as a recipient. After each gen-
eration each agent i compares his payoff with the payoff of
another randomly chosen agent j and adopts T j and t j if j has
a higher payoff. In addition, every agent is subject to muta-
tion. With probability 0.1 an agent receives a new t drawn
from a uniform distribution and also with probability 0.1 a
new T which is Gaussian distributed with standard deviation
s50.01 around the old T. If this new T becomes smaller
than zero, it is set to 0. Obviously, it seems to be the best
strategy for an individual to donate as little as possible, i.e.,
to have a very small T. However, the whole population
would be better off if everybody would cooperate. This
‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ can be solved in different ways,
e.g., by volunteering @4–6#.
Riolo et al. solve this problem by channeling help to-
wards others who are sufficiently similar to the donator. In-
stead of a cooperative population, the formation and decay of
cooperative clusters is observed for certain parameter ranges
~high P and low c, see Fig. 1!. The average tolerance of a
cooperative cluster grows slowly over time. Occasionally, it
declines sharply. This decline occurs when the cluster is ex-
ploited by agents that are sufficiently similar to the cluster’s
agents to get support, but do not help themselves. However,
the mechanism that generates these tides of tolerance re-
mained unclear @7#.
Here we develop a minimal model for tag-based coopera-
tion, which displays these ‘‘tides of tolerance’’ if there is a
net average drift towards more cooperation. We find that
these fluctuations vanish if such a drift is not included in the
model. The importance of this observation stems from the
fact that if we have species that can distinguish between
themselves and others and donate only to others with the
same tag, then this would in the long run lead to a single
group of cooperating species having a single tag. But if we
introduce a small rate of biased conversions from intolerant
to tolerant species, we observe a waxing and waning in time
of species with different tags. In other words, the small con-
version rate leads to a coexistence of different species, where*Electronic address: traulsen@theo-physik.uni-kiel.de
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different species appear cyclically at different times. This
consitutes a new mechanism that generates biodiversity in a
group of competing species.
This paper is organized as follows. First, the model of
Riolo et al. is simplified in order to allow an analytical treat-
ment. Then the system without the effects of mutations is
analyzed. Thereafter, we introduce a drift that increases the
tolerance and leads to oscillations of tolerance. We show that
the truncated mutations in the model of Riolo et al. also lead
to such a drift.
II. SIMPLIFIED REPLICATOR MODEL
A. Definition of the model
Here we simplify the model of Riolo et al. @3# in order to
allow for an analytical treatment. In a first step we restrict the
game to only two tags, red and blue. Similarly, we allow only
two tolerances. The agents can either only donate to others
bearing the same tag if they have zero tolerance T50 or to
every other agent (T51). This leads to four possible strate-
gies. Then we allow partners to donate and to receive in an
single interaction instead of defining different roles for do-
nators and receivers. We end up with the payoff matrix
~Tag, T! ~Red, 1! ~Blue, 1! ~Red, 0! ~Blue, 0!
~Red, 1! b2c b2c b2c 2c
~Blue, 1! b2c b2c 2c b2c
~Red, 0! b2c b b2c 0
~Blue, 0! b b2c 0 b2c
The strategies with T51 are obviously dominated by the
strategies with T50, because the payoff of an intolerant
player is always larger than the payoff of the corresponding
tolerant player. There are pure Nash equilibria for the intol-
erant strategies ~red, 0! and ~blue, 0!. In addition, there is an
evolutionary unstable mixed Nash equilibrium if these two
strategies are used with probability 12.
If the intolerant agents do not even cooperate within their
own group we recover the prisoner’s dilemma @8#, see Ap-
pendix A.
Instead of simulating a finite group of agents, we calculate
only the evolution of the probability that an agent uses a
certain strategy. In the following, p1 and p2 are the frequen-
cies of tolerant red and tolerant blue agents, respectively. p3
and p4 are the frequencies of the corresponding red and blue
intolerant agents. As p1
t
1p2
t
1p3
t
1p4
t
51, the state of the
system is completely determined by pt5(p1t ,p2t ,p3t ). The
trajectory can therefore be visualized as a trajectory in the
three-dimensional simplex shown in Fig. 2.
In order to apply standard replicator dynamics @9# we cal-
culate the mean payoffs from the payoff matrix as
P1
t
5~b2c !~p1
t
1p2
t
1p3
t !2cp4
t
,
P2
t
5~b2c !~p1
t
1p2
t
1p4
t !2cp3
t
,
P3
t
5~b2c !~p1
t
1p3
t !1bp2
t
, ~1!
P4
t
5~b2c !~p2
t
1p4
t !1bp1
t
,
^P& t5(
i51
4
p i
tP i
t
,
where P i is the payoff of the strategy with frequency p i .
Using Eq. ~1! the replicator equations can be written as
FIG. 1. Population dynamics for the first 500 generation of the
model of Riolo et al. @3#. The average tolerance and the donation
rate—i.e., the fraction of encounters that lead to a donation—show
fluctuations. When a cooperative cluster becomes dominant, its tol-
erance increases until the cluster becomes extinct (c50.1, b
51.0, and P53).
FIG. 2. The trajectories of the replicator dynamics move from
the inside of the simplex onto the boundaries. The corners represent
the pure strategies pi . Arrows indicate the stability of the fixed
points at the edges. There are two stable attractors called pred and
pblue ~dark gray! corresponding to stable lines of fixed points of Eq.
~2!. At the top only players with red tags survive whereas at the
bottom only players with blue tags can exist. The two basins of
attractions of these stable attractors are separated by a planar sepa-
ratrix given by Eq. ~3!. This separatrix is the basin of attraction for
the fixed point in the Nash equilibrium indicated by a black circle
(c50.4 and b51.0).
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p i
t11
5p i
t
1p i
t b~P i
t
2^P& t!, ~2!
where i51, . . . ,4. Here b determines the time scale. In the
following, we set b51. Our main interest is the attractors of
the system, and a modification of b would only modify the
velocities on the attractor.
B. Fixed points and separatrix
The dynamics of the system ~2! can roughly be character-
ized as follows, see Fig. 2. Most initial conditions lead to
fixed points where only one tag survives. The frequency of
intolerant players is typically higher than the frequency of
tolerant players here. There is a separatrix that divides the
basins of attraction of the two tags. On one side of the sepa-
ratrix red players will survive and on the other side blue
players. In addition, we find several fixed points on the edges
described in the following.
As in any replicator system, the mixed Nash equilibrium
pn5(0,0, 12 ) is a fixed point. Here the basin of attraction is
the separatrix. The separatrix shown in Fig. 2 can be calcu-
lated from the stability of this fixed point, which is discussed
for a more general case in Appendix B. pn is always part of
the separatrix, its normal corresponds to the eigenvector e3
5(12c ,11c ,2) of the corresponding Jacobi matrix Jn with
the eigenvalue l35(32c)/2.1. We find the equation
p3
s
5
1
2 @12~12c !p1
s
2~11c !p2
s # ~3!
for points on the separatrix. As we have @pt11(p1s ,p2s ,p3s )
2pt(p1s ,p2s ,p3s )#•e350, the system never leaves this plane
again.
In addition, there are two fixed lines if only one tag is
present: pred5(12x ,0,x) and pblue5(0,12x ,0), where 0
<x<1 is the fraction of intolerant players. The stability of
the fixed points on these lines depends on x. For 12x.c ,
the points are unstable and intolerant players with the oppo-
site tag can invade ~see Appendix B!. Finally, there is an
unstable fixed line for a completely tolerant population pT1
5(12y ,y ,0), where 0<y<1. The stability of this fixed line
is discussed in Appendix B.
So far, the system does not show any oscillation. It simply
relaxes to one of the fixed points described above. In the
following section a mechanism that generates oscillations
will be discussed.
III. INTRODUCTION OF A BIASED DRIFT
In order to generate oscillations in the system we have to
destabilize the attracting fixed points and force the system
through the separatrix. This can be realized by introducing
first ad hoc a drift that increases the fraction of tolerant
agents at the cost of the intolerant fraction of the same tag. If
we introduce such biased conversions into our model, Eq. ~2!
becomes
p1
t11
5p1
t
1p1
t ~P1
t
2^P t& !1«p3
t
, ~4!
p2
t11
5p2
t
1p2
t ~P2
t
2^P t& !1«~12p1
t
2p2
t
2p3
t !,
p3
t11
5p3
t
1p3
t ~P3
t
2^P t& !2«p3
t
.
The solution of these equations shown in Figs. 4 and 5 dis-
play oscillations in tolerance. These oscillations can be con-
sidered as the deterministic equivalent to the tides of toler-
ance in Ref. @3#.
In the model of Riolo et al. @3# such a drift is generated by
truncated mutations. The average tolerance is usually of the
order of s . Therefore the truncation of negative tolerances
decreases the probability for mutations that lower the toler-
ance, and leads to a drift towards higher tolerances. We re-
peated the simulations of Riolo et al. and found that 50.0%
of the tolerance mutations increase T while only 39.8% de-
crease T. The average mutation increases T by 1.331024
(c50.1, P53, average over 10 000 realizations with 30 000
generations each!. If we omit the tolerance mutations in the
model of Riolo et al., one ~low! tolerance is quickly inherited
by the whole population, see Fig. 3. The majority of players
belongs to a dominant cluster. The mean tag of this cluster—
and hence the donation rate—drifts slowly due to mutations
of the tags. Without mutations of the tags one tag is inherited
by the whole population after a short initial period. Conse-
quently, the donation rate becomes 100%, and tolerance mu-
tations do no longer influence the system.
A. Qualitative behavior
The attractor of the system ~4! is shown in Fig. 4, and the
time evolution of the strategies can be seen in Fig. 5. If
initially all strategies are present, the system shows periodic
oscillations for small « and c50.1. One tag becomes domi-
nant. The fraction of tolerant players increases due to the
biased conversions imposed by «.0 and intolerant players
with the opposite tag can invade and destroy the cluster,
giving rise to a new dominant cluster with the opposite tag.
This attractor shown in Fig. 4 has essentially the whole sim-
FIG. 3. Population dynamics for the first 200 generation of the
model of Riolo et al. @3# without tolerance mutations ~left! and
without tag mutations ~right!. Without tolerance mutations the do-
nation rate fluctuates due to tag mutations. After less than 100 gen-
erations all players inherit the same tolerance. Without tag muta-
tions the donation rate quickly rises to 100% when all players have
the same tag. The fluctuating tolerance does no longer influence the
system (c50.1, b51.0, and P53).
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plex as a basin of attraction. Only for very small or very high
values of c other fixed points become stable. The system can
be analyzed in two parts for «!1. Near the edges pred and
pblue, the replicator dynamics becomes irrelevant and the sys-
tem is mainly driven by biased conversions. Further away
from these edges the system is driven by the replicator dy-
namics. Here the dynamics is not altered by the biased con-
versions.
Our biased conversions lead the system from an edge that
is dominated by one color to an edge that is dominated by
the other color. For small c the trajectory leaves these edges
near the corners of the pure tolerant strategies, cf. Fig. 4.
However, these corners are never crossed as they are fixed
points.
B. Fixed points
Let us now analyze the system ~4! in more detail. The
fixed line pT15(12y ,y ,0) of Eq. ~2! is still a fixed line of
Eq. ~4!. For c,2 « , a fraction of the fixed line remains
stable, see Appendix B for details. However, as we are inter-
ested in «!1 the fixed line is usually unstable. Due to the
flow from intolerant to tolerant players, the edges pred and
pblue are no longer fixed. The fixed point pn5(0,0, 12 ) in the
mixed Nash equilibrium moves away from the edge for «.0
and is now given by pd5(«/c ,«/c , 122«/c). The stability of
this fixed point is discussed in Appendix B.
In addition, we find two more fixed points ps1 and ps2.
For «50 they correspond to the points where the population
with only one tag loses stability. These fixed points can be
calculated analytically, see Appendix C for details. The ex-
pansion for «!1 of ps1 is
ps1'S 12c2 2 «c 1 «
2
~c21 !c2
«2
c22c3
c1
~122 c !«
c2c2
2
«2
~c21 !2 c
D . ~5!
Due to the symmetry in the tags ps2 can easily be calculated
by exchanging p1 with p2 and p3 with p4512p12p2
2p3. As described above, we find ps15(12c ,0,c) for «
50. Increasing « moves it towards pd. For «5c(12c)/4
ps6 and pd collapse, here pd becomes stable.
For c,0.73 we have no fixed points that are stable in all
directions. The whole simplex is essentially the basin of at-
traction of the attractor shown in Fig. 4.
C. Bifurcation at «Ä0
The transition from the system without biased conver-
sions ~i.e., «50! to the system with biased conversions can
be analyzed in detail by considering the Poincare´ map shown
in Fig. 6.
At «.0 the fixed lines where only one tag is present van-
ish. This is caused by a saddle node bifurcation @10#. A fixed
line disappears at this bifurcation, and a small channel is
opened through which the system moves slowly to the other
side of the separatrix. The width of this channel is controlled
by «. For small « a linear dependence between « and the
oscillation frequency of the attractor is observed as shown in
Fig. 7. Such a linear dependence is expected in a saddle node
bifurcation with linear perturbation terms «p3 and «p4 @11#.
FIG. 4. Attractor of the system ~4! for c50.1. The black line is
the attractor, the gray points are the fixed points. The plane is the
separatrix for «50. The arrows indicate how the biased conversions
drive the system through the separatrix to the corner with only
tolerant individuals. Here individuals with the other tag can invade
and steer the system to a corner with mostly intolerant individuals.
Biased conversions lead to a tolerant corner again and the circle
continues ~«50.01, c50.1, and b51.0).
FIG. 5. The waxing and waning of the four different groups of
agents ~red agents: black, blue agents: gray, full lines: T51, and
dashed lines: T50) are caused by the following mechanism. A
cluster of tolerant red agents is invaded by intolerant blue agents
who convert via directed mutations to their tolerant counterpart,
giving rise to a blue cluster which is then invaded by red intolerant
agents. Although initially the number of red and blue tolerant agents
differed only by 1%, a tiny number (0.5%) of intolerant agents of
each tag is enough to generate large clusters that are segregated in
time ~«50.01, c50.1, and b51.0).
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In our model two small channels are opened by «.0, as
the separatrix is crossed twice in one oscillation. The rein-
jection in our model is caused by the replicator dynamics,
which drives the system to the channel of the opposite tag.
The dependence of the oscillation frequency on the param-
eter « for c50.1 is shown in Fig. 7. For values of «.0.02,
the dynamics changes. Here the fixed points pT1 that be-
come stable for «5c/2 begin to influence the dynamical sys-
tem.
D. Influence of the cost of cooperation c
Here we analyze the influence of the cost of cooperation
~c! on our system by defining different measures of order in
our model and by observing the influence of c on these mea-
sures. The donation rate is the probability that one player
donates to another, d5^12p3(p21p4)2p4(p11p3)& . The
fraction of tolerant individuals can be measured as p tol
5^p11p2& , and the asymmetry between the tags as a
5u^p11p3&2^p21p4&u. Here ^•& denotes a time average. In
addition, an average over different initial conditions is nec-
essary.
Figure 8 shows that these measures display changes at c
'0.02, c'0.66, c'0.73, and c'0.96. We now discuss the
reasons for these transitions. For c,« the points pT15(1
2y ,y ,0) are stable fixed points. In the case of «,c,2«
only a part of this fixed line is stable, see Appendix B for
details. For c.2« these fixed points become unstable, this
leads to a decrease of the asymmetry between tags at c
52«
For cooperation costs c.2« , the typical qualitative be-
havior is described above. The attractor of such a system can
be seen in Fig. 4. For higher costs c, the intolerant players
can invade earlier as their advantage is larger. In the follow-
ing we restrict ourselves to the case of «50.01. The quali-
FIG. 6. The Poincare´ map of the p1 shows the ‘‘channel’’
through which the trajectory crosses the separatrix. The black lines
are the function and the bisector. The distance between the function
and the bisector has been magnified by a factor of 10. Therefore the
course of iteration is drawn only schematically. A marks the point
where the separatrix is crossed due to biased conversions from p3 to
p1. Here p1 increases further, as the fraction p4 that exploits p1 is
still very small. For «50 the function and the bisector will match,
the separatrix can no longer be crossed ~«50.01, c50.1, and b
51.0).
FIG. 7. Dependence of the oscillation frequency on the mutation
rate «. The squares and the triangles are the numerical values for
c50.1 and c50.2, respectively. The line is a fit of the frequencies
for «<0.01. For small « the frequency increases as f5a«b. We
found b51.003660.0003 for c50.1 and b51.002160.0002 for c
50.2. A linear dependence is expected if the perturbation is linear
in «, as in our case. For high values of « the fixed line pT1 becomes
partially stable for «5c/2 and begins to influence the system.
Therefore the frequency decreases (b51.0).
FIG. 8. Influence of the cost c on the donation rate ~squares!, the
fraction of tolerant players ~triangles!, and the asymmetry between
the tags ~diamonds!. All symbols are averages over 10 000 initial
conditions and 100–10 000 time steps. The number of time steps is
taken as a uniformly distributed random number to exclude effects
resulting from changes of the oscillation frequency. The lines are
the analytical results for c.0.73, see Appendix C. The fraction of
tolerant players decreases as the time intervals where the tag is
invaded become longer. This has also an effect on the donation rate.
For c'0.66 a large change of the symmetry parameter is observed
when one symmetric attractor is replaced by two attractors which
are not symmetric. The fraction of tolerant players and the donation
rate decrease slightly at c'0.66. The donation rate and the symme-
try parameter increase until the fixed points ps6 become stable at
c'0.73. Here these parameters decrease again. When pd finally
becomes stable at c5(11A1216 e)/2'0.96, the symmetry is
complete again ~«50.01 and b51.0).
MINIMAL MODEL FOR TAG-BASED COOPERATION PHYSICAL REVIEW E 68, 046129 ~2003!
046129-5
Publications 55
tative behavior does not change until c'0.661. The attractor
for c50.66 can be seen in Fig. 9.
For c.0.661 the biased conversion can no longer drive
the system through the separatrix. Two different attractors
are observed for different initial conditions. In the original
model this behavior corresponds to the establishment of one
cooperative cluster which becomes tolerant due to the trun-
cated mutations. Intolerant individuals with the other tag try
to invade, but the dominant cluster becomes more intolerant
again and prevents an invasion. At c'0.73 the fixed points
ps6 become stable ~see Appendix C!. For higher values of c,
oscillations are no longer observed. For one eigenvalue of
the corresponding Jacobi matrix Js, we had ul1u,1 even for
smaller c. In addition, there is a pair of complex conjugated
eigenvalues that crosses the unit circle at c'0.73. Hence we
are observing a Hopf bifurcation here. For c.0.73 the sys-
tem spins into the fixed points ps6. For c'0.93 the imagi-
nary parts of the eigenvalues vanish. At c5(1
1A1216 e)/2'0.96, the stable fixed points ps6 collapse
with the unstable fixed point pd in a supercritical pitchfork
bifurcation. For higher values of c the fixed point pd is
stable.
IV. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We developed a minimal model for cooperation based on
similarity. This model shows oscillations in the population of
tolerant agents as two different groups dominate the popula-
tion successively. The mechanism that drives these oscilla-
tions is a drift towards more tolerance. Without such a drift a
cooperative cluster cannot be destabilized and will not give
way to a new cooperative cluster. In other words, the tempo-
rally segregated dynamical coexistence of different tags is
only possible if such a drift towards more tolerance exists.
Without such a drift only one species would be selected. This
is similar to the dynamical coexistence of species in the
rock-paper-scissors game @12#. The drift provides a new
mechanism for maintaining a dynamical biodiversity in bio-
logical systems @13#.
This mechanism prevents a single species from taking
over the whole population as it makes the dominant cluster
vulnerable. Agents can therefore exploit the cluster by ac-
cepting support without supporting the cluster. These free
riders consequently destroy the cooperative cluster again.
The cooperative cluster can only defend itself if the cost for
cooperation is sufficiently high. In this case the free riders
cannot take over the whole population.
The main results do not change if the number of tags is
increased. However, the analytical treatment becomes much
more complicated, as we have to deal with n21 coupled
nonlinear equations in the case of n tags. Yet, a population
model seems to be more appropriate in the case of more tags,
as our model shows a subsequent realization of all tags in the
same order.
If one analyzes a system with a spatial distribution of
agents instead of the well-mixed case described above, one
observes strong segregation between tags. Tolerant players
need to protect themselves against intolerant exploiters by
building a border of intolerant agents around them. The spa-
tially distributed system and the strategies that help to over-
come the segregation will be discussed in Ref. @14#.
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APPENDIX A: PRISONERS DILEMMA
The introduction of ‘‘never cooperate’’ agents which do
not donate at all @15# instead of the zero-tolerance agents
eliminates the difference between tags and leads to the pay-
off matrix
~Tag, T) ~Red, 11! ~Blue, 11! ~Red, 0! ~Blue, 0!
~Red, 11! b2c b2c 2c 2c
~Blue, 11! b2c b2c 2c 2c
~Red, 0! b b 0 0
~Blue, 0! b b 0 0
which describes the prisoner’s dilemma @1,8#.
FIG. 9. Attractor of the system ~4! for c50.66. The black line is
the attractor. The gray points are the fixed points. The plane is the
separatrix for «50. The arrows indicate the parts of the attractor
where it is mainly driven by the biased conversions. The system
does no longer cross the separatrix near the edges p11p351 and
p21p451. Near the fixed point pd the trajectory almost closes
itself. For higher values of c there are two separated attractors (c
50.66, «50.01, and b51.0).
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APPENDIX B: FIXED POINTS OF THE REPLICATOR
DYNAMICS
The stability of the fixed points with only one tag can be
calculated as follows. For pred5(12x ,0,x) and «50, we
find the Jacobian matrix
Jred5S 11~12x !~c2x1c x ! 0 ~c21 !x2c2c x 12x c x
~12x !~c2x1c x ! 0 11~c21 ! x2
D ,
~B1!
with the eigenvalues l151, l2512x , and l3511c2x .
The fixed point is marginally stable as long as x>c , for x
,c it becomes unstable. The reasoning can be adopted for
the fixed line pblue5(0,x ,0).
A fixed point that is conserved for «.0 can be found if
all players are tolerant. For pT15(12y ,y ,0), the Jacobian
matrix is given by
JT1
5S 11~c y¯1y ! y¯ 2c¯ y¯ y2« 0~c y¯1y ! y¯ 12c¯ y¯ y2« 0
2 y¯ y c¯1c y¯1« 22 y¯ y c¯2c y2« 11c y2«
D ,
~B2!
where y¯512y and c¯512c . The eigenvalues of this matrix
are l151, l2511cy2« , and l3511c(12y)2« . l i,1
(i51,2,3) is not possible for «50. Hence the fixed line is
unstable for «50. For «.0 there is an interval of stability
given by 12«/c,y,«/c . If this inequality and 0<y<1
are both fulfilled by y, the biased conversions ensure stability
of the fixed point although the replicator dynamics alone
would make this point unstable. The first inequation can only
be fulfilled for c,2« . For c,« it is always fulfilled and the
whole fixed line pT1 is stable.
The fixed point given by pd5(«/c ,«/c ,1/22«/c) reduces
to the mixed Nash equilibrium for «50. The Jacobi matrix
at this fixed point is
Jd5S 11
3 c «1«2c2
2 c
2~11c !«
2 c
~12c !~c22 « !
4 c
~11c !«
2 c 11
c «2«2c2
2 c
~11c !~c22 « !
4 c
~11c !«
c
2~11c !«
c
11
~12c !~c22 « !
2 c
D . ~B3!
The eigenvalues of this matrix are
l1512
g
2 ,
l2511
g~2c21 !2Ag~g18«c18«c2!
4 c ,
l3511
g~2c21 !1Ag~g18«c18«c2!
4 c , ~B4!
where g52«2c . For «50 we have l15l2512c/2,1 and l35 322(c/2).1. The third eigenvalue corresponds to an
unstable direction. The corresponding eigenvector is e35(12c ,11c ,2), which is the normal of the separatrix for «50. In the
case of «.0 we have l i,1 for i51,2,3 only if c.(11A1216 e)/2. Hence pd becomes stable where it coincides with the
fixed points ps1 described in Appendix C. In all other cases, at least one eigenvalue of Jd is outside the unit circle.
APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL FIXED POINTS
Numerical simulations show that the additional fixed points for «.0 can always be found in the plane spanned by (1
2c ,0,c), (0,12c ,0), and (0,0, 12 ). Together with p1t115p1t and p3t115p3t we have three equations that describe these points.
Two of the solutions are fixed points not described above. The first fixed point ps1 can be written as
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ps15S a1Aab22«2cAab12~a2« !2~a214ab14aAab !1/22c
~12c !~c22b22Aab !1~a214ab14aAab !1/2
4a
D , ~C1!
where a5c(12c) and b5a24« . ps2 can be calculated by exchanging p1 with p2 and p3 with p4512p12p22p3. These
fixed points have only real coordinates for b>0. For b50 we have ps15ps25pd.
The eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix at the fixed points ps6 can be calculated numerically. For «50.01 the fixed points are
only stable if c.0.73. At c5(11A1216 e)/2'0.96 they collapse with pd in a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation and form a
single stable fixed point.
For c.0.73 the fixed points ps6 are the only stable attractors and the order measures described in Sec. III D can be
calculated analytically. We find for c,0.96
d512p3~p21p4!2p4~p11p3!5
5a24«~11c !12Aab2~a214ab14aAab !1/2
4a , ~C2!
p tol5p11p25
3a24«12Aab2~a214ab14aAab !1/2
2c , ~C3!
a5up11p32p22p4u5
2a1~a214ab14aAab !1/2
2a . ~C4!
For c.0.96 the fixed point pd becomes stable and we find d5 121(«/c), p tol52(«/c), and a50.
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2.3 Stochastic gain in population dynamics
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Stochastic Gain in Population Dynamics
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We introduce an extension of the usual replicator dynamics to adaptive learning rates. We show that a
population with a dynamic learning rate can gain an increased average payoff in transient phases and
can also exploit external noise, leading the system away from the Nash equilibrium, in a resonancelike
fashion. The payoff versus noise curve resembles the signal to noise ratio curve in stochastic resonance.
Seen in this broad context, we introduce another mechanism that exploits fluctuations in order to
improve properties of the system. Such a mechanism could be of particular interest in economic
systems.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.93.028701 PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.40.Ca, 87.23.Cc, 89.65.Gh
Game theory [1] describes situations in which the suc-
cess or payoff of an individual depends on its own action
as well as on the actions of others. This paradigm can be
applied to biological systems, as evolution through natu-
ral selection can be viewed as an optimization process in
which the fitness landscape changes with the state of the
adaptive populations [2]. Evolutionary game theory fo-
cuses mainly on systems with a single fitness function for
all individuals, which is identified with the payoff func-
tion of a game [3–5]. In nature, often different popula-
tions with different ambitions interact with each other, as
shoppers and sellers [6], attackers and defenders [6], or
males and females [5]. Here the payoff functions are
different for the interacting populations. A mean-field
description of such asymmetric conflicts is given by the
coupled replicator equations [4,5,7]. These equations have
a very rich dynamical behavior and can even display
Hamiltonian chaos [8,9]. In previous work [3–5] it has
been tacitly assumed that both populations have the same
adaptation mechanisms. But it seems to be natural that
different mechanisms are applied by the interacting
populations, e.g., different adaptation rates. Here we ana-
lyze such systems for the case that both populations have
slightly different adaptation mechanisms. We assume that
one population can control its own adaptation rate. This
alters the velocity when the system is approaching the
stable Nash equilibria [10] in strategy space, leading to an
increased average payoff.
In real systems, fluctuations disturbing the system are
to be expected. Such disturbances can arise from a variety
of effects, e.g., errors of the players [11], deviations from a
perfectly mixed population, or immigration of individu-
als with different strategy distributions. So far, stochastic
extensions to the replicator dynamics have mainly been
analyzed in the context of equilibrium selection [12,13].
Here we show that a population with an adaptive learning
rate can obtain an increased payoff if these fluctuations
are present. For small noise intensities the average payoff
increases, while very large fluctuations can no longer be
exploited, leading to a decrease of the average payoff.
This recalls the stochastic resonance effect [14–17],
where the signal to noise ratio of a system is improved
for intermediate noise intensities. In contrast to the usual
stochastic resonance, a periodic force is not involved
here, making the mechanism more similar to coherence
resonance [18]. Seen in this broader context, we introduce
another mechanism that exploits fluctuations in order to
improve the performance of the system.
We consider two adaptive species X and Y— each with
different strategies—that are involved in a repeated
game. Both populations have different objectives de-
scribed by payoff matrices Px and Py. The fraction of
individuals xi that adopt a certain strategy i grows propor-
tional to the relative payoff of the strategy i; the same
holds for Y. In the presence of noise, this coevolution can
be described by the coupled replicator equations
_xi  xixxi  hxi  xi ;
_yi  yiyyi  hyi  yi ;
(1)
where x and y are the learning rates of the populations.
We assume for simplicity that the noise i is Gaussian
with autocorrelation hki t	ljs	i  2ijklt s	 as in
Ref. [12]. We also follow Ref. [12] in choosing reflecting
boundaries. The payoffs are defined as xi  Px 
 y	i,
hxi  xT 
 Px 
 y, and similarly for y.
We extend the usual replicator dynamics by introduc-
ing adaptive learning rates as
x  1 tanhx		; (2)
where 	  hxi  hyi is the time dependent differ-
ence between the average payoffs of the populations and
x  0 is a ‘‘perception ability’’ of the population. In
order to maintain the basic features of the replicator
dynamics, the learning rate must be a positive function
with hi  1, which is ensured by Eq. (2). For x > 0 the
population X learns slower if it is currently in a good
position; otherwise, it learns faster. The value of x
determines how well a population can assess its current
state. The adaptive learning rate leads to a faster escape
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from unfavorable states, while on the other hand the
population tends to remain in preferable states. Other
choices for x which ensure these properties mentioned
above will not alter our results. In the following, we focus
on a setting where only one population has an adaptive
learning rate x as in Eq. (2).
The noise introduced above drives the system away
from the Nash equilibrium and leads for small amplitude
to a positive gain of the population with an adaptive
learning rate, whereas for large noise amplitudes the
fluctuations smear out the trajectories in phase space so
strongly that they can no longer be exploited. Hence, we
expect an optimal noise effect for intermediate values of
. In order to be able to compare the payoffs of both
populations, we assume that the dynamics starts from the
Nash equilibrium.
As a first example, we consider the zero-sum game
‘‘matching pennies’’ [3,19]. Here both players can choose
between two options 1. Player one wins if both players
select the same option and player two wins otherwise.
The game is described by the payoff matrices
Px 
1 1
1 1

 Py: (3)
The replicator equations follow from Eqs. (1) and (3) as
_x 2xx2y 1	x 1	  x;
_y 2yy2x 1	y 1	  y; (4)
where x  x0 and y  y0. Let us first consider the zero
noise limit in the case x  y  1. As for all zero-sum
games, i.e., Px  PTy , the system (1) without noise be-
comes Hamiltonian and has a constant of motion [20].
Here the constant is given byHx; y	  2 lnx1 x	
2 lny1 y	. The trajectories oscillate around the Nash
equilibrium at x  y  1=2. Hx; y	 is connected to the
temporal integral of the average payoff hxi 
xt	T 
 Px 
 yt during a period with hxi > 0,
Z t1
t0
hxidt  Hx0;
1
2
	 H1
2
; 1
2
	
4
; (5)
where x; y	  x0; 12	 at t0 and x; y	  12 ; x0	 at t1.
If we include adaptive learning rates (2) into the sys-
tem, we find _Hx; y	  2 tanhx			  0, vanish-
ing for x  0. Hence, adaptive learning rates dampen
the oscillations around the Nash equilibrium, and the
trajectories in the x y plane spiral towards the Nash
equilibrium where hxi  hyi  0 (see Fig. 1). In addi-
tion, this leads to an increased payoff of one population.
As the matrices (3) describe a zero-sum game, it is
sufficient for a population if it knows its own current
average payoff h	i  2hxi.
Numerical simulations for x > 0 show that the tem-
poral integral of the payoff becomes* Z t1
t0
hxidt
+
x0;y0	
  1
8
Hx1; y1	 Hx0; y0	: (6)
The averaged initial value Hx0; y0	 can be calculated asR
1
0 dx0dy0Hx0; y0	  8. For t! 1 the system relaxes to
the Nash equilibrium where H  8 ln2. Hence, we find for
the average cumulated payoff with h
R1
t0
hxidtix0;y0	  1
8
8 ln2 8	  0:307. Numerical simulations yield
0:308 0:005 independent of . We conclude that a
population can increase its average payoff if it has an
adaptive learning rate x > 0 and if the game does not
start in the Nash equilibrium. The adaptation parameter 
influences only the time scale on which the Nash equilib-
rium is approached.
Small noise intensities drive the system away from the
fixed point and the population with the adaptive learning
rate gains an increased payoff. If the noise amplitude 
becomes too large, the trajectories will be smeared out
homogeneously over the positive (gray) and negative
(white) payoff regions in phase space (Fig. 1). This im-
plies that the average gain of population one decreases to
zero; cf. Fig. 2. Although the average payoff is very small
even for the optimal noise intensity, the cumulated payoff
increases linearly in time. This means that for long times
the gained payoff accumulates to a profitable value.
As a second application we analyze the effect of adap-
tive learning rates and noise on the prisoner’s dilemma.
We use the standard payoff matrix [22]
Px 

3 0
5 1

 Py; (7)
where rows and columns are placed in the order ‘‘coop-
erate’’ and ‘‘defect.’’As this game is not a zero-sum game,
the population with the adaptive learning rate must be
able to compare its own average payoff with the oppo-
nent’s average payoff. The replicator dynamics of this
system is determined by Eqs. (1) and (7),
_x  xxx 1	1 y	  x;
_y  yyy 1	1 x	  y: (8)
x
y
t
 
〈Π 
(t) 
〉 
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.5
0.5
-0.5
1.0
1.0 0 500 1000
FIG. 1. Matching pennies: Comparison between the behavior
of a population with a constant learning rate [i.e., x  0 (thin
lines)] and a population with an adaptive learning rate [per-
ception ability x  10 (thick lines)]. The opponent has in both
cases a constant learning rate y  1. Left: Trajectories in
strategy space. Arrows show the vector field of the replicator
dynamics. Population X has positive (negative) average payoff
in gray (white) areas. Right: Time development of the average
payoff of the population X. The adaptive learning rate increases
the time intervals in which the corresponding population has a
positive payoff, dampening the oscillations around the Nash
equilibrium [21].
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There is a stable fixed point in the Nash equilibrium x 
y  0 where both players defect and an unstable fixed
point for mutual cooperation, i.e., x  y  1.
The average payoff difference under the influence of
noise is similar as in matching pennies. Small fluctua-
tions lead the system slowly away from the Nash equilib-
rium and tend to increase the payoff. If the fluctuations
are too large, they disturb the population with adaptive
learning rates and the payoff decreases again (see Fig. 3).
Interestingly enough, here too much noise even leads to a
decreasing payoff difference.
In order to describe the ‘‘stochastic gain’’ effect ana-
lytically, we introduce a simplified model. A lineariza-
tion of Eq. (8) around the stable Nash equilibrium leads
for constant learning rates to _x  xx x and _y 
yy y. We now analyze a game in which the repli-
cator dynamics is given by these linear equations and
include adaptive learning rates based on the payoffs for
the prisoner’s dilemma. With 	  5x y	 the adap-
tive learning rate x becomes x  1 tanh5x
y	  1 5x y	 for ; x; y 1. The simplified sys-
tem can be viewed as a small noise expansion of the
prisoner’s dilemma, where the trajectory stays close to
the Nash equilibrium. For y  1 the simplified noisy
replicator equations read
_x x 0xx y	  x; (9a)
_y y y; (9b)
where 0  5. The effect of different constant learning
rates is discussed in Ref. [23]. The mechanism we intro-
duce here is more intricate, as the adaptive learning rate
leads to a dynamical adjustment of the learning rate, and
the average of x  1 0x y	 over all possible strat-
egies is y  1.
Equation (9b) describes an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck pro-
cess [24]; here the dynamics is restricted to 0  y  1.
The Fokker-Planck equation [25] for py  pyy; tjy0; t0	,
_p y 
d
dy

ypy 
2
2
d
dy
py

; (10)
has the stationary solution psy N yey2=2 , where
N 1y 
R
1
0 e
y2=2dy. We find the mean value hy	i as
hyi 
Z 1
0
dypyy 
1 e2	

p
erf1

	 : (11)
y is a correlated stochastic process which appears in
Eq. (9a) as a multiplicative noise. Numerical simulations
indicate that we may neglect the stochastic nature of y
and replace it by hyi for small . This leads to an approxi-
mated Fokker-Planck equation for px  pxx; tjx0; 0	,
_p x 
d
dx

ax	px 
2
2
d
dx
px

; (12)
where ax	  x x0x hyi	. Since x is (similarly to
y) also restricted to 0  x  1, we find the stationary
solution
psx N x exp

 x
2
2
 2
0x3
32
 
0hyix2
2

(13)
with the normalization constantN x. Since x is typically
of the order of  for  1, the term x2=2 is finite.
Therefore, we can expand Eq. (13) for 0  1 and obtain
by expanding hxi again an analytical expression for
h	i  5hxi  hyi	,
h	i  50 d
d0
hxi  50

2
2
 31 	2  21 	

5
3
 7
6
21 	



2
3
 
	
; (14)
where   1

p
erf1=	 and   e1=
2
. The asymptotics of Eq. (14) can be computed as h	i  0=242	 for  1 and
0 1 2
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
α x = 1.0
α x = 0.1
σ 
 
 
 
 
〈∆Π
〉
FIG. 3. Prisoner’s dilemma: Average payoff difference of a
population with an adaptive learning rate against a population
with a constant learning rate for different noise intensities. The
negative payoffs arise from the fact that we have x <y for
x < y (	t  0:01, y  0, averages over 2 104 initial con-
ditions and 2 104 time steps).
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
 x = 1.0
 x = 0.1
σ 
 
 
 
〈Π
〉×1
04
α
α
FIG. 2. Matching pennies: Average payoff of a population
with an adaptive learning rate against a population with a
constant learning rate under the influence of noise for different
noise intensities (y  0, averages over 2 104 initial condi-
tions and 2 104 time steps; see [21] for further details).
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h	i  05
2
 35
6
	2 for  1. We stress that this sim-
plified system which consists of a stable fixed point with a
linear adaptive learning rate in the presence of noise is the
simplest possible model that describes the stochastic gain
effect. Figure 4 shows a comparison between the analyti-
cal payoff difference Eq. (14) and a simulation of
Eqs. (9a),(9b).
To summarize, we have introduced an extension to the
usual replicator dynamics that modifies the learning rates
using a simple ‘‘win stay–lose shift’’ rule. In this way, a
population optimizes the payoff difference to a competing
population. This simple rule leads to a convergence to-
wards the mixed Nash equilibrium for the game of
matching pennies [26]. Even in games with stable Nash
equilibria as the prisoner’s dilemma, transient phases can
be exploited, although the basins of attraction are not
altered, as, e.g., in Ref. [23]. Weak external noise drives
the system into the transient regime and leads to an
increased gain for one adaptive population.
In conclusion, we have found a learning process which
improves the gain of the population with an adaptive
learning rate under the influence of external noise.
Fluctuations lead to an increased payoff for intermediate
noise intensities in a resonancelike fashion. This phe-
nomenon could be of particular interest in economics,
where interactions are always subject to external distur-
bances [6,13,27].
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3 Discussion
3.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, a minimal model for similarity based cooperation motivated by the model of
Riolo et al. (2001) has been introduced and analyzed. Cooperation does not evolve if agents
are not forced to cooperate within their own group (Hauert, 2002a; Roberts and Sherratt,
2002). In our simplified model we can show this explicitly by reducing the payoff matrix to
a Prisoner’s Dilemma. It has been argued that this reduces the biological relevance of such
models. However, there can be situations in which this approach is justified. One possibility
is that different mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation between groups and within
groups are present. For example, in small groups direct or indirect reciprocity can work,
whereas strangers are first assessed from their group membership. Another possibility are
groups in which it is difficult to refuse to cooperate with others from the own group, e.g. to
refuse to speak the own native language.
For mixed systems with random interactions the minimal model for similarity based co-
operation introduced in this thesis can be solved analytically. This analytical insight allows
to identify the driving mechanisms that lead to this kind of dynamical behavior. We have
shown that oscillations are only observed if a drift towards more tolerant strategies is present
that destabilizes fixed points. This understanding of the key features of the model allows to
construct more complicated and realistic models again.
In spatially extended systems, similarity based cooperation leads to the absence of cooper-
ation between groups and segregation (Sigmund and Nowak, 2001). If the drift towards more
tolerant strategies is implemented as a local update mechanism, it leads to the emergence of
spiral waves in the system based upon a cyclic dominance of strategies. Further, different
mechanisms to overcome the segregation are discussed. The minimal model allows to an-
alyze related models on spatial lattices. One key question is whether tags can increase the
cooperation at all. If they allow to induce cooperation between small groups in a population
of non-cooperative individuals, this is obviously the case. Recently, it has been shown that
even if unconditional defectors are present, i.e. if agents are not forced to cooperate within
their own group, tag based mechanisms can lead to high degrees of cooperation (Axelrod
et al., 2004). The similarity based cooperation mechanism has been analyzed both in spa-
tial systems with finite populations and in the limit of infinite populations. The differences
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in the dynamics of these systems have two main reasons: First, the population is finite. A
second point is the restriction of interactions to a small fraction of the population. The latter
requirement can easily be relaxed applying game dynamics in finite populations. This part
of evolutionary game theory has attracted growing attention recently (Nowak et al., 2004;
Taylor et al., 2004; Fudenberg et al., 2004; Claussen and Traulsen, 2005).
In the second part of this thesis, asymmetric conflicts have been discussed. In these sys-
tems, two populations with different selection mechanisms can be analyzed directly. It has
been shown that an adaptive selection rate can help to exploit external fluctuations. These
adaptive selection rates can be viewed as an interpolation between two previously discussed
game dynamics: the standard replicator dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) and the
adjusted replicator dynamics (Maynard Smith, 1982). The stochastic gain effect is found
with the assumption that stochastic elements of the dynamics can be captured by adding a
Langevin term of Gaussian distributed noise to the replicator equations, as previously pro-
posed (Fudenberg and Harris, 1992). There are several other examples for positive effects
of randomness as noise induced pattern formation, coherence resonance or stochastic reso-
nance. However, the stochastic gain effect is the first example for a game theoretic system
that shows such a feature. In all these systems, the response of the system is improved by
noise. There are several sources for such a kind of noise: External fluctuations can influence
the system, errors of individuals or deviations from a mixed system can lead to disturbances.
A particular interesting case is the noise arising from finite populations, where a certain noise
is always present. The introduction of the Moran process to frequency dependent selection
by Nowak et al. (2004) provides a standard model for game theory in finite populations. The
frequency dependent Moran process includes a quantity that can be defined as intensity of
selection. This allows to address the stochastic gain problem in finite populations. First nu-
merical simulations indicate that also internal fluctuations can be be exploited by populations
with adaptive selection pressure.
However, the stochastic gain effect leads to several other interesting questions. One ques-
tion is of course whether the stochastic gain effect can be realized in game theoretic systems
describing economic interactions. In this case, it might be possible to transfer it to real world
markets. However, these systems usually consider a different situation in which a single
trader interacts in a large market with a vanishing influence on the market development. In
these situations, individual payoffs are hard to compare. Hence, the selection rate can no
longer depend on payoff differences. However, the selection rate could be adjusted depend-
ing on a market index. It remains to be seen whether such a strategy can be successful in
real markets. A probably more serious problem, is the definition of an equilibrium. While
in zero sum games the payoffs of the other party can easily be accessed, it is not clear what
it means to be “in an advantageous situation” at a market, as these markets are usually not
stationary. However, traders have their personal perception of the market situation and apply
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similar mechanisms, although they do not necessarily have a solid mathematical basis. In
conclusion, the application of this mechanism seems to be in principle possible. However,
more work into this direction has to be made and there is no simple way to get rich from
fluctuations.
3.2 Outlook
The similarity based cooperation mechanism allows to analyze the dynamics of such systems
in detail. So far, it has been analyzed in a well mixed system and on a simple lattice. To
incorporate the nature of real world interaction structures, more realistic geometries have to
be considered, as small world networks.
This thesis has been restricted to systems in which individuals always cooperate with
others from their own group. In spatially extended systems, interesting phenomena can
be observed when this requirement is relaxed. In particular, Axelrod et al. (2004) have
shown numerically that tags can increase the level of cooperation. This feature is also found
in our model. However, a detailed comparison between spatially extended systems with
and without tags is lacking so far. Numerical simulations of our model show that tags can
promote cooperation even for parameter values that do not promote cooperation if tags are
not present in the system. This feature has to be analyzed and quantified in detail.
The introduction of tags that differentiate groups leads to the possibility to impose a selec-
tion mechanism on these groups depending on their composition. Based on the work in this
thesis, a model in which group selection emerges from individual selection by a population
structure has been developed (Traulsen et al., 2005b; Traulsen and Nowak, 2005).
The stochastic gain effect has only been analyzed in systems based on the replicator dy-
namics so far. This basically assumes an infinite population. The next step is to transfer this
model to finite populations. As a first step, the relationship between different game dynami-
cal formulations in finite and infinite populations has been analyzed (Traulsen et al., 2005a).
In finite populations, a quantity for the pressure of selection can be defined. An adaptive
selection rate would naturally modify this parameter and analyze a dynamic adjustment of
the pressure of selection. In finite populations, a certain randomness is always present. How-
ever, such an inherent noise is not always captured by additive Langevin terms of Gaussian
white noise (Claussen and Traulsen, 2005). However, first numerical simulations indicate
that such noise arising from the inherent stochasticity can effectively be exploited by adap-
tive selection rates. The stochastic gain effect for finite populations is a first requirement to
transfer the mechanism to game theoretic interactions that mimic real world markets, as the
minority game.
For the field of evolutionary game theory, there are still challenges in the future. So far,
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evolutionary game theory lead to a better qualitative understanding of many biological sys-
tems. However, quantitative experiments are extremely difficult since the fitness of individ-
uals is very hard to measure. An increased cooperation with experimentalists is necessary.
The theory is so far mainly restricted to well mixed systems or simple spatial lattices. To
capture the geometry of real biological and social interactions, a generalization to more uni-
versal systems as networks is necessary. However, in game theoretic systems on networks
only few analytical results are possible (Matsen and Nowak, 2004; Lieberman et al., 2005).
The complexity of biology requires many more extensions of evolutionary game theory.
For example, the complex genotype-phenotype mapping has been ignored so far. Hence,
more work is necessary on the interaction of strategies that are encoded in genomic se-
quences.
Another important point already raised above is the relationship between finite and infinite
populations. Most evolutionary game dynamics have been studied in infinite populations so
far. Finite population effects often lead to surprising results (Nowak et al., 2004) and may
challenge traditional results from evolutionary game theory. For example, the concept of
evolutionary stability has to be altered when effects of a finite population size are considered.
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